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Summary 
 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the Russian Federation both stated that ‘we no longer see each other as 
adversaries’. The opportunity for finally making the ‘Common European Home’ come true 
was present. During the ‘honeymoon’ in the first half of the 1990s, the diplomatic relations 
normalized, and in 1994 Russia and NATO signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement, 
as a first step towards an official partnership. However, after this short period of political 
prosperity, the relationship again developed to the worse. This master’s thesis aims to 
examine why Russia and NATO failed to establish a normative partnership, using Martin 
Smith’s definitions on partnership types. By examining important historical events, official 
doctrines, existing research on the field and official statements in light of realism and 
constructivism theory, I try to illuminate whether the problems with collaborating may be 
explained by a mutual military fear of each other that could be traced back mainly to the Cold 
War; or if it is due to a considerable difference in political culture, norms and values due to 
their distinct history. This thesis should offer an insight to the rather fluctuating relationship 
between Russia and NATO in the post-Cold War history, and explain reasons for why this is. 
It will also offer an indication of what kind of political and diplomatic actions NATO and 
Russia have to undertake in the future in order to develop a normative partnership, if that is 
what they desire. 
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from the remarkable occurrences in Eastern Europe during this period. Russia has never been, 
and will most likely never be ‘any other state’, and has always been of special interest to me. 
In Norway, as in many of the NATO member states, one often gets socialized into a bit of 
skepticism towards the Russian Federation. Yet, I never managed to decide whether I agreed 
to this skepticism, or if Russia deserved a more nuanced discussion. When I in the spring of 
2010 was fortunate enough to be invited to participate in an exchange program to St. 
Petersburg, I was able to challenge these questions. The lectures in Russian Foreign and 
Security Policy offered an invaluable insight into the Russian foreign policy thinking, and its 
relations with the West. As I returned to Norway, the topic for my master’s thesis was already 
clear.  
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1 
1 Introduction 
 
“I cannot forecast to you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside 
an enigma. But there may be a key, and that key is Russian national interest”.  
Winston Churchill 
(Lo, 2002, p. 1) 
 
Security policy is every state’s main concern. After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, 
European states divided into sovereign territorial states, constantly struggling for their 
national security and freedom. In the years that followed, wars were the norm rather than the 
exception. After the devastation of two devastating World Wars, the most powerful states in 
Europe gathered in the search for a final solution for European security in order to regain 
peace and stability. Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’ claim that war of all against all is a natural state 
since there is no higher rule to enforce order (Nye, 2007, p. 4). In Europe, the eager to create 
such a higher rule to prevent states from going to war proved to be quite successful. However, 
after the end of the Second World War, another sort of conflict occurred. The West feared the 
powerful Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, commonly known as the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union was believed to be a threat to European peace and stability, and when they 
started to expand westwards, some of the more powerful states in Western Europe decided to 
make an alliance. In 1949 in Washington D.C, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, which 
marked the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)1.  
 
The year 1991 mark the most outstanding shift in European security. With the fall of the 
Soviet Union, the balance of power in Europe changed. The Russian Federation, descendant 
of what were once the most immediate and serious threats to the European security alliance 
during the Cold War, announced that they no longer considered themselves an adversary to 
the West. Still, the relations between NATO and Russia stayed tense, causing both parties 
political headaches. Throughout the 1990s and beyond, the political climate has shifted 
                                                
1 Also referred to as ‘the Alliance’ 
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several times. However, today the Russian Federation is incorporated in the NATO-Russia 
Council, and considered a strategic partner to the West. Still, any further development in the 
relationship seems to be difficult to reach.  
 
There is an infinite amount of literature about Russia. –Its impressive history, the enormous 
territory, the traditions of autocratic rule and extreme power, and what by some has been 
described as a certain eccentricity has been examined, discussed, admired and criticized. 
However, the question why Russia does not managed to incorporate in NATO the same way 
most other European states have managed is still open for appendance. Several answers have 
been given in the past. One is that the reason is that Russia once was a feared enemy of 
Europe. Still, West Germany managed to become part of the alliance only ten years after 
Hitler-Germany fell. Further, it has been argued it is due to their communist past. However, 
that does not explain how states like Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia managed to become normative partners with NATO in 2004. Also, it has been 
claimed that it is a lack of interest of will. Still, all three presidents of the Russian Federation 
have been positive to such a membership. –And NATO on their side has also been eager to 
establish closer ties with Russia, as we can see from the establishment of the NATO-Russia 
Council (NRC). At the Carnegie Endowment in Brussels the 18th of September 2009, 
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in his speech “of all of NATO’s relationships 
with Partner countries, none holds greater potential than the NATO-Russia relationship”. Yet, 
“none is so much burdened by misperceptions, mistrust and diverging political agendas” 
(Rasmussen, 2009). Whenever the word Russia is mentioned, it seems to give a number of 
strong associations far beyond just the territory in which it operates or the sum of the people 
living there. This, I believe, might be part of the answer why Russia is such a special case in 
the partnership category, and thus does not integrate with NATO. However, it could also be 
that the two former adversaries still hold some fear for each other, and therefore cling to the 
‘balance of power’ thinking, instead of going uniting in partnership. This is the question that I 
will return to shortly. Before this, I will present what is meant by the term ‘partnership’.  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Partnership 
The term partnership has been used several times in the literature when defining the relations 
between Russia and NATO. Martin A. Smith2 argues that there are three possible types or 
levels of partnership that Russia can enjoy within NATO. The first level of partnership to be 
considered is a pragmatic partnership. This is by Smith (Smith, 2006, p. 112) seen as a 
relation that is being motivated “fundamentally by concerns about protecting national 
interests and national security”. This kind of partnership does not include any shared 
understanding or agreements on matters beyond the ad hoc arrangements. During the Cold 
War, a few attempts of cooperation on e.g. arms reduction or joint peace agreements mach up 
to this level, but as Smith (2006) also acknowledges it can be discussed whether this is to be 
considered as a ‘partnership’ at all. The underlying necessity for a pragmatic partnership to 
function between Russia and NATO is an area of mutual problems, and mutual advantages in 
solving them. This may also be defined as so-called ‘zero-sum games’ (Smith, 2006). This 
does not include partnership in the way the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) discussed it during 
the Lisbon summit in November 2010. Nor is it what Anders Fogh Rasmussen has been 
mentioning in several announcements before, during and after the Lisbon Summit.  
 
The second type of partnership is the one that was discussed during the Lisbon summit, 
namely strategic partnership. This kind of partnership calls for a broader agreement and 
common understanding amongst the partners on what is the overall nature of international 
relations. In security policy, the essential part is what – or who – constitutes a source of 
potential as well as actual security threats, as well as an agreement on what should be the 
most appropriate means in terms of responding to threats (Smith, 2006, p. 112). Still, despite 
an underlying agreement on how to conduct foreign policy, a strategic partnership does leave 
a notion that there might be changes to national interest that may affect the partnership from 
time to time. Smith further acknowledges that “strategic partnership are still founded on 
concerns about each partner’s relative national power, security and prestige in relations to 
other international actors” (Smith, 2006, p. 112). In the case of Russia and NATO, strategic 
partnership calls for a common understanding of what should be the main priorities 
                                                
2 Senior Lecture in defense and international affairs at the Royal Military Academy, 
Sandhurst, UK.  
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internationally, but it ensure the Russian government’s entitlement to be in control of their 
own national security and internal domestic affairs within their own territory.  
 
The third alternative is a normative partnership. This is the kind of partnership eligible for 
full integration of Russia in the North Atlantic alliance. In a normative partnership the 
relations between Russia and NATO will be shaped by agreements on “a common set of 
behavioral norms, values and standards” (Smith, 2006, p. 112). This makes Russia and NATO 
not only a community of security, but also a community of shared values. Alliances like 
NATO are dependent upon a low conflict level. Common values and norms for how to 
respond to crisis are therefore crucial in order to ensure stability and efficiency within the 
Alliance. A normative partnership, as opposed to the two mentioned above, does not 
necessarily need a common external threat or enemy in order to league together. In a 
normative partnership the focus is to a larger extent on the shared values and norms, and 
agreements go far beyond just the actual ad hoc arrangements in actual crisis. In order to 
establish a well functioning normative partnership, all partners must have equal rights to 
scrutinize each other in order to get an open and transparent relationship. This does not only 
mean transparency in foreign policy making and in cases where both are involved directly, 
but also openness and transparency in internal affairs like state spending, military and defense 
planning, democracy, human rights, etc. (Smith, 2006). The result of a normative partnership 
is thus more commitment and control, but also more insight into the other parties political and 
security planning, which provides more trust and security. Normative partnership is however 
not necessarily full ‘membership’. Membership can provide legal rights beyond what a 
normative partnership includes. In the end, it is also important to include that these three types 
of partnership not can be considered as mutually exclusive. They may all be present at the 
same time, describing different political areas. However, the discussion in the analysis will 
focus on the overall, general tendencies, and not specific areas of politics.  
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1.1 Research Question 
 
Under chapter three, “partnerships”, in the group of expert’s report, the expert panel state, 
“On the list of NATO partners, Russia is in its own category” (Albright, Jeroen van der Veer, 
& Group of experts, 2010). As the introduction implies in addition to the citation above, I will 
examine why this is so:  
Which are the dominant reasons why the Russian Federation and NATO fail to reach a 
normative partnership?  
The guiding assumption for this thesis is that Russia and NATO either are too different in 
terms of political ideas, norms and values. This would make it difficult to agree upon a 
common security vision for Europe within the framework of NATO. Or, that Russia and 
NATO still show signs of mutual mistrust, as during the Cold War. The lack of partnership 
progress could then be explained by a mutual fear for their national security. Russia and 
NATO share a very unique history, and without an understanding or a consideration of the 
historical impact, it is impossible to understand the complexity of this matter. In order to 
answer this research question I will therefore analyze the Russian-NATO relationship 
between 1991 and 2010. I will focus on important historical events that have impacted their 
relationship. In the discussions I will offer theoretical explanations for how Russia and NATO 
have dealt with these situation and what impact this has had on their capability to move 
forward into a normative partnership.  
 
In chapter 2, I will present the methodological framework for this thesis. I have chosen to start 
this chapter with defining the two cases, Russia and NATO. Here I will explain how the two 
are organized, and list four obvious differences between the two, which I have to take into 
consideration. Secondly, I will present the theoretical framework, which will be used in order 
to conduct the analysis in order to answer the research question. Hence, the theory becomes 
an integrated part of the research method. In chapter 3 I will thoroughly examine important 
events during the time period from 1991 to 2010. What is interesting about this period of time 
is that unexpected and important political occurrences take place, causing great changes to the 
European security environment. I will apply theoretical explanations, and analyze what these 
events and changes both within and between Russia and NATO have impacted their ability to 
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reach a normative partnership. In chapter 4 I will sum up the discussions from chapter 3, and 
see whether I can provide a proper answer to the research question. This part will not offer a 
final conclusion, but hopefully offer new insight into the Russia-NATO partnership debate. 
Here, I will also dear to give some of my own assumptions for what the near future might 
hold for the Russia-NATO partnership development.  
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2 Methodological Framework 
Introduction 
This thesis will offer an in-depth analysis of the Russian-NATO historical and political 
development, aiming to examine some of the factors that have hindered the Russian 
Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to reach a normative partnership. First, 
I will present the two cases separately, starting with the Russian Federation and then the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Afterwards, I will discuss some obvious 
differences between the two, which are important in order to understand where the research 
question derives from, and why it is a unique case to study. Second, I will go through the 
research method that is used in the analysis, and explain why I believe a text analysis of a 
selected number of official concepts and statements in addition to secondary literature offers 
the best possible methodological approach to the thesis’ question. Third, the theoretical 
perspectives will be presented and explained, before I explain how I will apply this theoretical 
approach in the analysis. Fourth, I will discuss the challenges that may encounter with this 
kind of research method, and explain how I am aiming to solve this in order to ensure a high 
validity.  
 
2.1 The Units of Analysis 
 
The units of analysis are the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). While the first case is a sovereign state, a Eurasian great power and a former 
adversary to Western Europe, the latter one is a security alliance established after the second 
World War, consisting of 28 member states; including Europe’s greatest powers and the 
worlds only superpower. In the upcoming paragraphs I will define the two properly in order to 
explain how main characteristics have built up over time. Further, I will take into 
consideration the obvious differences given their distinct nature, and explain how it is 
possible to apply the theoretical framework to both cases, although Russia is a sovereign state, 
while NATO is a security alliance.  
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The Russian Federation 
The ‘Russian federation’ is here the sum of the governing body of Russia, the natural follower 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)3. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the emergence of the Russian Federation was a complex process that developed over time. 
However, when Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991 organized a referendum across the Soviet Union, 
Boris Yeltsin saw the opportunity to place a second question on the referendum ballot asking 
the people of Russia if they supported a Russian presidency (Bacon, 2010, p. 23). Approval 
was duly gained. This was the first active step towards a Russian federation. On 21 September 
1993, Boris Yeltsin dissolved the old two-tier system of Congress and Supreme Soviet, and 
established a new framework for state power (Remington, 2001 ; Sakwa, 2008). This resulted 
in the Russian Federation. Russia is today a semi-presidential system. The constitution from 
1993 grants the president extensive power. The president is responsible for nominating the 
prime minister (Sakwa, 2008, p. 105). According to the constitution, “the president is the head 
of state and the guarantor of the constitution” (Article 80). The president is also head of the 
Security Council, confirms Russia’s military and foreign policy doctrines, appoint the 
commander of chief of the Russian armed forces and, according to the constitution, exercises 
leadership of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (Article 86) (Sakwa 2008:107). The 
word Kremlin, originally meaning the building in which the government is located, is often 
used as a synonym to the Russian government, understood as the sum of the political elite in 
the Russian Federation, or the higher members of government. Moscow, the main capital of 
Russia, is often used the same way. In this thesis ‘Moscow’ and ‘Kremlin’ will hence be used 
synonymously to the ‘Russian political elite’ or the ‘government of Russia’.  
 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the old Marxist-Leninist ideology had to be 
replaced by a new doctrine. Kremlin decided to create an official document that could form 
the basis for the Russian Federation’s political foundation. This resulted in the creation of The 
National Security Concept (NSC) (Sakwa 2008). The NSC includes both the Foreign Policy 
Concept and the Military Doctrine. These documents outline the broader vision in foreign and 
security policy planning, and sets out to systematize the views on the content and main areas 
in the foreign policy activities in Russia. These concepts are in accordance with Russian 
                                                
3 Hereafter also referred to as the Soviet Union 
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federal law, international law and international treaties that the Russian Federation is 
restrained to follow. Each new president formulates his own NSC document.  
 
There are several Russian characteristics inherited from the Soviet Union era, which is still 
embraced and sustained by the contemporary Russian elite (Lo, 2002; Lomagin, 2005). The 
notion of being a great power stands out as the most important one. The Russian political elite 
does not see Russia as a normal state dating back to 1991. The common apprehension is that 
Russia is among the world’s greatest powers, and deserves to be considered an equal to e.g. 
France, the United Kingdom but also the United States. Being part of the NATO’s alliance as 
a secondary member state or as ‘just any other partner’ does therefore not seem fear from a 
Russian point of view. Further, Russia also considers itself a regional hegemony, with special 
rights in the near abroad that used to be part of the Soviet empire. Hence, Russia reacts 
negatively to any Western interference in this area. This is obvious in the Russian response to 
NATO’s enlargement debate, as will be discussed later in the analysis. Last, but not least, 
Russia has also an autocratic state-oriented rather than individual-oriented power, as opposed 
to the norm within the Alliance. The impact due to this will be explained in the paragraph for 
challenges and possibilities for comparison.  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)4 was established in 1949, its mission 
was to be a political and military alliance, securing a collective defense and peace on the 
European continent (Discover NATO, 2010). NATO’s enduring purpose is identified in their 
strategic concepts5, which identifies what NATO is and what it ought to be in the future. The 
North Atlantic Treaty6, signed in Washington D.C. on 4 April 1949, still constitutes NATO’s 
main body. In order to define NATO I will rely on article 1 and 4 through 6 in the 
Washington Treaty. Article 1 states that the parties undertake to settle any international 
disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in order to secure peace, security 
and justice The treaty also emphasizes that NATO will act in accordance with the United 
Nations. Further, Article 4 states that the parties will consult together whenever, in the 
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of 
                                                
4 Hereafter also referred to as ‘the Alliance’.  
5 Hereafter also referred to as NATO’s concept. 
6 Hereafter, also referred to as the Washington Treaty 
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the parties is threatened. Today, this might be the most important article. After the end of the 
Cold War, the level of military threat against the Alliance severely reduced. Article 5, which I 
will come back to, therefore no longer seemed as relevant. However, the consultation of other 
states in cases of military, economical or political threat is an enormously important part of 
the European security structure. Article 5, as I mentioned, might be the symbolically most 
important article in the Washington Treaty. Here, it is famously acknowledged that the parties 
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all. Consequently, all member states take on an obligation 
and a right to assist those attacked if necessary. Finally, Article 6 defines the territory for the 
purpose of Article 5, which includes the territory of or under jurisdiction of any member state 
in Europe of North America, in addition to forces, vessels, aircraft or other military material 
when in or over these territories or on certain sea areas7. After the Cold War ended, NATO 
has released three strategic concepts that aim to define NATO’s purpose in the post-Cold War 
era. Even thought NATO is an organization, it has several qualities like a state. Each member 
state is represented in what could be seen as a government. In times of crisis, it also operates 
as one body, in accordance with the Washington Treaty. Also, even though each member state 
has the right to have their own opinion about international affairs, NATO as an organization 
offers the official opinion that is based on consensus, and which is binding for each member 
state to support. When I look at NATO in this thesis, it is NATO’s official opinion I use, and 
not the separate opinion of any of the member states.  
 
The most obvious threat to European security at that time was commonly believed to be the 
Soviet Union and its communist ideology that was feared by the capitalist West. According to 
alliance theory, alliances will cease to exist when the threat that originally motivated the 
establishment of the alliance disappears or severely decrease (McCalla, 1996). However, 
NATO has survived the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, and has 
even become strengthened due to integration of several former Warsaw Pact states. Today, 
NATO has developed into being not only a traditional defense community and a security 
alliance, but also increasingly an alliance of values and political diplomacy, with an increased 
focus on Article 4. NATO has also taken on new security challenges by going ‘out-of-area’. 
                                                
7 All articles are from The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949 retrieved 
from NATO’s homepage http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm 
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The so-called ‘out-of-area’ debate runs out of a more liberal interpretation of Article 6, and 
has transformed NATO into not only a European, but also increasingly a global actor. This 
has severely changed their security agenda, and necessitated new partner states and increased 
areas of influence.  
Asymmetrical cases: challenges and possibilities for comparison  
Due to NATO’s open door policy confirmed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, the analysis will 
be based on the assumption that it is Russia that has to change in order to make a normative 
partnership happen. However, there are four main areas where Russia and NATO are not 
symmetrical, which will cause underlying problems on both sides. These are 1) the 
geographical challenges, 2) the political differences, 3) the economical aspect and 4) the 
military aspect. While the geographical and political differences may pose problems in terms 
of reaching a normative partnership, the economical and military aspect may play in favor of 
such integration. Following, I will explain each of the four asymmetrical areas. First, the size 
of the Russian continent is important in terms of understanding why Russia has been, and 
must be treated differently compared to the other Warsaw Pact states. Russia continues to be 
the world’s largest country measured in size, with a territory about the same size as the total 
area of NATO’s member states today. To include this extensive territory under Article 6, and 
hence article 5, is almost unimaginable. However, when it comes to population, NATO’s total 
population do by far outnumber the approximately 140 million people (2010) living in Russia. 
Further, Russia has an impressive 20 241 km long border towards several non-NATO member 
states, e.g. China, North Korea, Mongolia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. This, in addition to 
Russia’s immense coastline will definitely add a number of new challenges to NATO’s 
security planning, if Russia was to be included under Article 5. As a result, the economical 
cost will also skyrocket, something that might be difficult for the member states to accept 
during harsh financial times. A normative partnership with Russia would also result in 
common border between NATO and the Middle East and Asia. This would also create new 
strategic dilemmas for the Alliance.  
Secondly, the political and democratic history and culture is severely different in Russia 
compared to the member states in the Alliance. After World War II, the West and the Soviet 
Union developed very differently when it comes to regime type. And regime type affects the 
way foreign affairs are conducted. In a democracy where the people are invited to give their 
opinion, the decision-making process in foreign affairs are often affected. State leaders are 
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often affected by the voice of the people, and whether or not they want membership in certain 
alliances or organizations. In a more autocratic regime as the Soviet Union represented, the 
voice of the people is of minor importance when it comes to political decision-making. While 
NATO is funded on the Western values and ideas shaped by the European revolutions and 
reforms, Russia has inherited the much more authoritarian tradition from the Soviet Union. In 
the West, liberal values of individual freedom and liberal rights like human security and 
societal security dominates. This is seen in the bottom-up organization of human security 
first, and the state being a tool for human prioritizes. In the West the question is therefore 
‘what can NATO do for the security of the people?’ (see e.g. Dahl, 1989). In Russia it seems 
to be an opposite approach to state vs. people, where state security in the traditional way, with 
emphasis on border security, and governmental security is seen as a prerequisite to individual 
security. In the Russian tradition, a free state is therefore more important than a free people, 
and the people are seen as a tool in order to secure the state. Thus, Russia and NATO might 
be driven by different motivation when it comes to security policy.  
 
Thirdly, there is an important economical aspect in the cooperation and partnership between 
the Alliance and Russia due to the major Russian oil and gas reserves. Russia supply NATO 
member states with necessary oil and gas, and to secure this delivery both in peacetime as 
well as in times of war is important. The Russian energy resources have also proven to be an 
important bargaining tool in Russian coercive diplomacy. To include Russia as a normative 
partner would thus give NATO a more stable energy security, and make the Alliance less 
vulnerable. Fourth, while Russia and NATO balanced each other relatively well during the 
Cold War; the situation today is in NATO favor. To raise the level of military development 
and social development to a level where Russia matches up with the rest of NATO will cost a 
lot. This has to be taken into consideration if Russia was to join NATO. Russia’s military 
equipment is old and out-dated and the personnel not professionalized enough. In order to 
make the Russian military compatible with the NATO forces, reforms are needed (Sakwa, 
2008). However, Russia is able to contribute with an extensive number of personnel and 
would also take a fair part of the burden sharing in a conflict. Further, Russia would increase 
the factor of deterrence, as NATO would expand massively. In the long run, it could therefore 
be valuable to have Russia on board.  
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2.2 Research method   
 
In order to analyze which factors that hinder Russia and NATO in reaching a normative 
partnership, I will carry out a case study. John Gerring notes “case connotes a spatially 
delimited phenomenon observed at a single point in time or over some period of time” (2007, 
p. 19). A more technical definition would be that: 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clear”.  
(Yin, 2003, p. 13) 
Here, the case is the Russian Federation as a potential normative partner with NATO. The 
time period stretches from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and up until the Lisbon 
Summit in November 2010.  
Analysis of Russia-NATO history  
As Pouliot (Pouliot, 2010, p. 5) argues “it is not only who we are that drives what we do; it is 
also what we do that determines who we are”. By looking into the post-Cold War history and 
focus on political, economical and military events; how they emerged, how they were dealt 
with, and how they were solved; it is possible to create a picture of how political actors 
behave, and what differs between leaders, states, and organizations. The constructivist 
Emmanuel Adler goes as far as to say that  
 
“Rather than using history as a descriptive method, constructivism has history ‘build 
in’ as part of theories. Historicity, therefore, shows up as part of the contexts that 
make possible social reality, the path-dependent processes involving structural and 
agent change and the mechanisms involved in the explanation of change”.  
Emanuel Adler (2002) 
“Since no social realities are natural, they are the results of political and social processes that 
are rooted in history” (Pouliot, 2010, p. 63). Hence, a historical perspective will offer a solid 
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explanation for how the Russia-NATO relationship has developed, and why Russia faces so 
many difficulties on its way towards a closer partnership with NATO. Over the twenty years 
that have past since the Cold War ended, several major events have changed the security 
environment in Europe. This has impacted the Russia-NATO relationship. I have therefore 
chosen to divide this period into five periods. The first period will cover the years from 1991 
to 1993/94, which I characterize as a period of ‘identity crisis’ in Russia, due to their lack of 
an identity in the ‘new’ Europe. This period has also been characterized as a ‘honeymoon’ 
(see e.g. Smith, 2006) between NATO and Russia because of the increasingly good relations 
between the two former adversaries after 1991. The second period goes from 1993/94 to 
2000. These years are characterized by both an improvement in the relations, but also a 
gradual decline. The third period covers Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term from 2000 
until 2004. Here, the European return to ‘hard security’ leads to a ‘soft cooperation’ between 
Russia and NATO on both hard and soft security issues. Fourth, the period from 2004 to 2007 
is mainly shaped by the fact that Russia returns to their ‘great power habitus’, and are more 
active in global affairs. This continues during the fifth, and last, period from 2004 to 2010. As 
several crises occur, the diplomatic relations developed throughout the 1990s and onwards are 
put to the test. 
 
Within each period I will discuss why Russia and NATO is not capable of reaching an 
agreement for normative partnership, as it is defined by Smith (2006). In order to explain this, 
I will apply the theoretical framework as laid out thoroughly in chapter 2.3. The aim is to find 
a pattern that might reveal whether the factors for Russia and NATO’s lack of progression are 
due to mainly realpolitik or a lack of a common ‘we-ness’. These theoretical approaches are 
not mutually exclusive, and may very well function supplementary. In the discussion I will 
therefore rely on general tendencies rather than just one occurrence or document. The 
discussion will then form the basis for my conclusion.  
Text analysis  
When analyzing the post-Cold War Russia-NATO relationship, text material offers a valuable 
insight because this period is both well documented and extensively studied. Pouliot (2010, p. 
64) argues that an inductive view of documents, other text material and historical events, in 
addition to a more interpretive historical dimension will develop both subjective and objective 
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knowledge. This is because we are given an insight in how social agents attribute practicality 
into their own reality and objectified knowledge, which derives from ‘standing back’ from the 
time and place where the different incidents took place, and an opportunity to contextualize it 
in a historical perspective. For the analysis I will therefore rely on a selected number of earlier 
research, secondary literature and official doctrines. In addition to this I will make use of 
speeches, statements and news interviews where representatives of both the Russian 
Federation and NATO are represented. To rely on previous research can sometimes be 
problematic. Conclusions drawn by other scientists may appear as ‘truths’. I have therefore 
chosen to compare a number of different sources in order to test their validity. The research 
chosen is also of high quality, and is carefully examined before taken into account. The 
reason behind this is that I believe there is too much valuable information in previous 
literature, not to take it into account. Twenty years is also a fairly long period of time, and this 
research offers thick information about past events that are difficult to get primary sources on 
today.  
 
Next to the secondary literature I will also consult NATO’s Strategic Concepts issued in 
1991, 1999 and 2010. In addition to these main sources I will include relevant documents 
from NATO’s homepage, where statements, speeches, and reports are released continually. In 
addition to secondary literature on the Russian Federation, I will also include the Foreign 
Policy Concept’s from 2000 and 2008, the Russia’s National Strategy to 2020, in addition to 
speeches and statements given by the president and other officials on Kremlin’s official 
homepage, Russia Today8, or collected from books on this field. The official documents will 
give an insight to the official response to foreign security aspects within Russia and NATO. 
Statements and speeches are included because I believe that they may supplement the written 
sources. Official documents give a solid picture of the overall tendency during a particular 
period. Interviews and speeches, on the other hand are more spontaneous, and may reveal 
more accurate tendencies right then and there. In addition to this, interviews and other oral 
statements are often less prepared and may therefore be more honest and descriptive. While 
an official doctrine may take months to write with several high officials consulting each other 
                                                
8 Russia Today (RT) is a global television network based in Russia and funded by the Russian 
government. RT offers English translation as standard. All news on RT is from a Russian 
point of view. 
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to make the language correct, an oral statement might be more impulsive and spontaneous. 
Statements are therefore meant to balance the official texts, and offer a broader perspective.   
 
2.3 Theoretical Perspectives 
The theoretical foundation of this current thesis will draw assumptions in international politics 
after the end of the Cold War in 1991. The post-Cold War period offers a number of political 
theories aiming to explain and predict the international political system, however I have 
chosen to include realism and constructivism. I will start out with realism, since this has been 
the traditional way of explaining international relations, and especially Russian foreign policy 
relations towards the West and NATO. Then, I will continue with constructivism as an 
alternative theoretical explanation, because of the totally different perspective that is offered 
by constructivist thinking. While realism is merely based on material, economical and 
military power-maximization and capabilities, constructivism offers a theoretical framework 
based on the idea of differences in ideas, norms and values. Hence, I will test whether the 
unfulfilled partnership between Russia and NATO is best explained by real-political factors 
or factors explained by constructivism. Following, I will give a short introduction of the 
international environment that states are part of. Then, I will return to realism and 
constructivism theory, in order to give a proper definition of the two. Afterwards, I will 
explain how I will apply these theories to the analysis. 
Introduction 
 “Politics is not a monotonic phenomenon. At times it is a mystique, a matter of faith, a 
secular religion; at other times the logic of politics is no less practical, no less ‘matter of 
fact’, than the logic of economics”. 
(Sartori, 1969, p. 411) 
The international system consists of independent, sovereign and equal nation states. Thus, all 
nation states are free and independent in conducting their domestic policy as well as their 
foreign policy relating to other states or organizations (Kamath, 1990). Still, as the word 
‘system’ indicates, all states are part of a community of states. As Secretary-General in the 
United Nations (UN) Ban Ki-moon stated: 
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“Our times demand a new definition of leadership - global leadership. They demand a 
new constellation of international cooperation - governments, civil society and the 
private sector, working together for a collective global good”.  
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon  
Speech at World Economic Forum  
Davos, Switzerland,  
29 January 2009 
 
The constellation of an international cooperation between states and the importance of 
international law put some restriction to states, and their freedom and independence in policy-
making. During the Cold War, most theorists argued that balance of power; or rather a 
‘balance of terror’ shaped the international environment. A massive military rearmament was 
deterring states from going to war. Security, theorists said, was stability and military power 
(see the debate in Lebow, 2007). Nevertheless, after the Cold War, military power was only 
seen as one in many ways to maintain stability and security. States, especially in Europe got 
more interconnected through agreements, alliances, trade and cooperation, leaving military 
power a matter of secondary importance as a measurement on stability. They emphasized the 
importance of common understandings, values, ideas, language etc. I will now go deeper into 
these different kinds of theoretical approaches.  
 
2.4 Realism 
Realism theory can be said to have displayed fundamental political thoughts for almost 2500 
years (Lebow, 2007, p. 53) and, thus, offered the main theoretical explanation for 
international relations and state behavior until the end of the Cold War. First, realism is based 
on the assumption that states are the main actors on the international stage. Second, states are 
unitary actors; meaning that domestic factors like regime type, the leader(s), and their 
personality does not have any impact. Third, states are considered to be rational actors, 
meaning that they have optional alternatives, and that they choose their alternative after a 
rational decision-making process. And fourth, that the international order is characterized by 
anarchy, creating a permanent security vacuum (Thorun, 2009, pp. 17-18). This is a 
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traditional vision that needs to be expressed with some modifications when applied to 
international relations today. Implicit in the realist theory lays the assumption that realist 
states always put their nations best interests first. Taylor (Taylor, 1978) defines national 
interest a situation that benefits the whole rather than just one part of a state. Yet, this 
definition is at best a bit vague. Interest may be indicating plurality of demands, wishes and 
desires communicated to the policy-makers by the political community (Kamath, 1990, pp. 
31-32). This definition equates interest with ‘common good’ or ‘public welfare’. If we 
combine the two, national interest will be the common good of a whole state, rather than for 
just one area or one part of the state. Or, in other words, what is the most desirable and 
benefitting situation for a nation-state. 
 
In Morgenthau’s famous book Politics Among Nations, he argues that all politics is a struggle 
for power that is “inseparable from social life itself” (Morgenthau situated in Lebow, 2007, p. 
55). He also says that the main signpost that helps political realists to understand international 
politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1993, 
p. 5). Here, power is seen as an objective category that is universally valid meaning that it 
does not change over time. Realists also expect state leaders to be able to distinguish between 
their own opinions and their official duty as a leader (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1993). State 
leaders may very well act upon their own philosophy or political sympathy in order to gain 
popularity, but they still manage to distinguish between their official duty and their private 
preferences in order to govern in accordance with the nations best interest. Further, realists do 
not lack concern on political ideals and moral principles, but they require a sharp distinction 
between what is desirable; everywhere at all times, and what is possible under the concrete 
circumstances (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1993). This has to do with the aspect of national 
interest being power-maximization, rather than focusing on what is seen as morally correct. In 
terms of realism, material-institutional capital refers to military forces, money and material 
riches (industrial capacity, demographics, infrastructure, military equipment etc.), as well as 
alliances, ‘friends’, and institutional ties like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Pouliot, 2010, p. 148).    
 
Closely related to national interest is the term national security. States justifies political force 
with their right to secure national security (Kamath, 1990). State interest will in most cases be 
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synonymous with what is in accordance with national security, since it is in each states 
interest to secure security. According to Robert E. Osgood, Jr., national security “necessarily 
denotes a nation’s determination to preserve certain interests, at all costs” (Situated in 
Kamath, 1990, p. 40). These certain interests are here first and foremost state’s basic 
principles like national integrity, political independence and fundamental governmental 
institutions. During the Cold War, balance of power, or balance of threat, was an important 
aspect of world stability and security. The balance of power between the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union was an important factor why it did not escalate to ‘hot-war’ 
between the two. Today, balance of power is less obvious as the international community has 
shifted from a bipolar, via unipolar, towards an increasingly multipolar structure. Realists 
today still consider military capability and alliances as the very foundation of security 
(Lebow, 2007, p. 56). However, as the classical realist such as Thucydides acknowledged, 
military power is a double-edged sword, since extensive military capacity is just as likely to 
provoke war as to prevent conflicts (Lebow, 2007, p. 56). In the relation between Russia and 
NATO this is an important aspect, since increased military capacity within one side seemingly 
always provokes conflicts between the two.  
 
2.5 Social Constructivism  
 
The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union hasted the decline of realism as 
theoretical explanation for international relations (Lebow, 2007, p. 53). This was mainly 
because of the new range of political problems that occurred, which realism did not explain 
satisfactorily. As early as the 1940s, Carr (1946:148-149, situated in Taylor 1978:127) added 
to realism theory that given the continuity of institutions and other considerations, it is 
impossible to analyze international politics without attributing personality to the state. Social 
constructivists manage to capture this perspective by adding the element of collective ideas 
when analyzing states foreign policy making. Social constructivists believe that international 
life is social in the sense that states relate to one another through ideas, and constructivist in 
the sense that these ideas help define who and what states are (Thorun, 2009, p. 22). This 
offers a new way to view nation states. It creates a picture of each state being unique, and 
calls for a deeper understanding of history, facilities and political will. They acknowledge that 
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nation-states are built up by people, and that these people can affect the way international 
policy is planned and set out in life. Constructivists, broadly defined, share a critique of the 
static material assumptions of traditional international relations theory, and especially realism 
(Fierke, 2007). Constructivism is therefore not a supplement to realism theory, but a whole 
different way of interpreting the world of social science and the way states function. The 
critical movements in the 1980s and 90s shared the aim of changing nuclear status quo. In the 
mid-to-late 1980s, questions began to be raised about the theories and scientific methods of 
international relations and the extent to which they were implicated in the production of 
international power (Fierke, 2007, p. 167).  
 
After 1991, many of the earlier assumptions about the Cold War were questioned. Scholars 
within the realism school of thought had been focusing on material and structural causes, like 
balance of power, and did not believe that social mechanism or human characteristics could 
change this picture. When realism theory failed to predict and explain the end of the Cold 
War, in addition to the continuation of NATO despite the fall of their main adversary; the 
Soviet Union, realism theory was again questioned (Fierke, 2007). This boosted the 
emergence of alternative theoretical approaches to international relations. Constructivism has 
become an inescapable theoretical explanation for current international mechanisms (Zehfuss, 
2002, p. 2). Further, Zehfuss acknowledges that the ‘debate’ within international relations 
theory will concentrate increasingly around rationalist and constructivists. Here, ‘rationalists’ 
refers to realists. Constructivists and realists main dispute is whether the reality in 
international relations are constant, or whether they change over time (Zehfuss, 2002). While 
realists claim that international relations are constant, and further that the main interests, 
motives, and means will stay the same over time despite constant changes in the international 
environment, constructivists believe that international relations are shaped by their 
surroundings, and will differ in accordance with time and place.  
 
Wendt’s constructivism, which I will focus on, argues that political relations are made, and 
not given (Wendt, 1999; Zehfuss, 2002). This brings us to the social element. Politics is 
constructed through social interaction, and hence learned and adopted by states in interaction 
with other states. This ‘social’ part helps explain the core assumption in constructivism, and 
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distinguish it from realism. Constructivists see social basis rather than material power 
(Barkin, 2003) as important when understanding why states act the way they do. The 
emphasis on social dimensions and the possibility for rapid changes in the international 
security environment allow more emphasis on historical and cultural background, historical 
and cultural changes, help explain differences between states, and their interaction. As Barkin 
puts it, “what actors do in international relations, the interests that they hold, and the 
structures which they operate within are defined by social norms and ideas rather than by 
objective or material conditions” (2003, p. 326). In terms of cultural-symbolic capital 
constructivists mention artifacts, narratives and symbols that are used to define the world that 
surrounds us and that legitimize it (Pouliot, 2010, p. 148). Social constructivism therefore 
argues that states are part of a social system, where they are affected by each other’s norms, 
values and ideas (Fierke, 2007, p. 168) in major policy decisions, but where these differences 
also might lead to conflicts. While material factors stay more or less the same over time and 
are difficult to change, norms and values are learned and therefore easier changed. Still, one 
should not underestimate how deep-rooted a state’s culture is. To change an entire culture or a 
set of values takes drastic matters or, alternatively a very long period of time.   
 
The main mechanism in a security community like NATO is, according to constructivists, the 
collective identity formation (Pouliot, 2010, p. 3). To further explain this, Pouliot quotes 
Wendt’s explanation “a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred 
and at the limit transcended altogether” (Wendt (1999) sited in Pouliot, 2010). While realists 
would claim that Russia is just ‘any another state’ in NATO’s near abroad, with its own 
political interests and security aspects put first, constructivists acknowledge that Russia is in a 
special position with a Russian ‘habitus’ that is different from NATO’s habitus. Here, Pouliot 
(2010) asks two important questions. What does it mean to talk about a Russian or NATO 
habitus? And the question all constructivists are so eager to answer, namely whether states are 
people too. Wend claims that “states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute 
anthropomorphic qualities like desire, beliefs, and intentionality” (Wendt, 1999, p. 197). This 
makes it possible to use an analysis of what states have done in the past, in order to 
understand why states act the way they do today. –And, to some extend, predict how states 
may act in certain situations in the near future. 
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Constructivists take each nation’s particular identity into account, and explain why some 
states are more easily integrated into the Alliance than others, by social factors and historical 
differences. Constructivists therefore use Russia’s political past and distinct identity as 
explanation for why it is such a unique case when it comes to reaching normative partnership 
with NATO. The idea that international relations are a social construction creates a picture of 
states being something more than just a power-maximizing organization concerned about 
their national interest. While the traditional view has been to look for material factors, like 
military capacity or economical strength; constructivists focus more on the norms and shared 
understanding of legitimate behavior. Returning to Pouliot, he emphasizes the ‘we-ness’ as 
the main component in security alliances (Pouliot, 2010, p. 3). In order to become part of an 
alliance, states have to adopt a ‘we-thinking’, and make it become part of a state’s own self-
understanding.  
 
2.6 Realism and constructivism applied 
 
The guiding assumption for this thesis is that Russia and NATO struggle to reach a 
partnership due to one of the following explanations: Either, the problem is explained by 
realism; emphasizing the material means. It might be that the views on what creates national 
security is incompatible, and that balance of power still is seen as the best way to ensure 
security and stability. Or, it could be that a constructivist approach is more suitable, 
emphasizing the need for a common goal, - or a common ‘we-ness’. Several important 
political occurrences have taken place over the last twenty years. Political and military 
competition can explain some of them. Yet, others have been motivated by a lack of mutual 
understanding or an unwillingness to learn each other’s norms and values, and become part of 
the ‘we’. In most cases it will be a combination of the two. The challenge is therefore to make 
up a system for how to categorize an event or a time period to belong within one of the two 
categories. The way I will do this is to look at the means and the goals behind Russia and 
NATO’s political actions. When Russia and NATO disagree over the means, e.g. whether or 
not to use military force in order to deter, or to force their policy through, this is often a sign 
of a dispute due to real-political manners. However, when the dispute is mainly on what is 
believed to be the best result or goal, it is most likely a result of a difference in political 
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values and norms for how to behave as a state, and a difference in the idea of what constitutes 
a beneficial foreign policy. –Or what states are best served by. In addition to this, it is 
important to include a more linguistic approach, looking for what kind of political terms that 
are used in order to describe the foreign policy conducted. How Moscow describes the 
political environment, their own political actions as well as NATO’s, and how NATO does 
the same. In order to exemplify this, I can use the dispute over the planned missile defense 
shield in Europe. Russia and NATO agrees on the goal; to secure Europe from missiles shot 
from the Middle East and Asia. Still, they are not able to agree on how they are going to build 
it and who is going to be part of it with a so-called ‘red-button right’. This points towards a 
realism explanation. It is not the aspect of power-maximization or national security they 
disagree on, since both are interested in this goal. Rather, it is the norms for how to cooperate, 
and it is an obvious lack of a common ‘we-ness’. This can be confirmed by the linguistics 
used to discuss this issue. When a political occurrence is discussed I will look for the terms 
that are used to see if they are based on realism; with fear for state security, use of military 
threat, sanctions etc. in addition to a genuine lack of trust in each other.  –Or if the terms are 
concentrated around cultural habitus, self-image, lack of collective identity and an agreed 
‘we-ness’.  
 
Being part of an alliance gives benefits, as well as obligations, on two levels. First, there is the 
material level, in which NATO is the collective military defense. Second, it is the ‘social’ 
level, which can be defined as the common visions for where one wants to be in the future. –
A notion of being part of something bigger; a community of values that is considered ‘good’ 
by the European community as a whole. In order to become a member of an alliance like 
NATO, both levels have to be accepted and appreciated in order to adapt to the new way of 
political thinking.  
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2.7 Validity 
Internal validity 
The internal validity; whether it is a causal relationship between what is found in the text 
material and the reason why Russia and NATO do not reach on a normative partnership, is 
difficult to measure. The world of politics is complex and incidental. According to Pouliot 
(2010, p. 64), in the constructivist style of reasoning, “historical analysis and interpretation go 
hand in hand”. History can tell us not only who the Russian Federation are, but also what 
Moscow do. By observing the historical development, it is possible to in turn create a pattern 
for what is normal behavior, in order to be able to recognize abnormal behavior. The 
interpretation is, however, the weak link in this research. When an occurrence is being 
analyzed, it is important to strive for objectivity. One way of doing this is to freeze the event 
in time and room, and apply the theoretical framework with as little room for own 
interpretation as possible. Each event should therefore first be looked at as an isolated event, 
before any context is applied. I will also aim at sticking strictly to what the text material 
contains, and not allow for any prior assumptions to decide. This however extremely difficult, 
and might be a weakness in the analysis. When interpreting historical occurrences I will 
confront the concepts and see whether they are in accordance with the general trend during 
the particular time period.  
 
However, decisions and opinions can be formed within the understanding of political 
correctness, political trade-offs, tactics etc, and not as a result of entirely rational processes. It 
could therefore be debated whether the official concepts really are good guiding tools for the 
actual formulation and implementation of foreign policy (Godzimirski, 2005). –Hence a poor 
measurement on what Russia and NATO think about future partnership, and why normative 
partnership is not achieved. In the article Russia and NATO, Community if values or 
community of interests? Jakub M. Godzimirski discusses this very same problem, but he 
further acknowledges that these official doctrines are “the best tools available to enable us to 
learn more about and get better insight into the mental world of the Russian policy- and 
decision-making community” (2005, p. 66). The official doctrine are therefore only guiding 
tools, and may differ from the actual decision-making in a certain case. Nevertheless, the 
doctrines still offer a valid glimpse into a state or organization’s strategies and visions. They 
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will therefore offer a good picture on the general tendencies for where Russia and NATO is 
going in terms of partnership. With the secondary literature and the historical analysis several 
aspects will be covered, with in total will secure a higher validity. As mentioned, the oral 
statements, comments, speeches etc. will also function as a supplement in order to broaden 
the aspect of the analysis and absorb more nuances.  
External Validity 
Since there are no similar cases to apply findings to, external validity is a known weakness in 
case studies; and especially in single-case studies like this one. Further, it is always a risk of 
low external validity in text analyzes since it is difficult to conduct valid tests to verify 
findings. However, in order to argue against this critique, I have chosen to quote John Gerring 
(2007, p. 1), which notes: “sometimes, in-depth knowledge of an individual example is more 
helpful than fleeting knowledge about a larger number of examples”. In-depth knowledge on 
one case is valuable when establishing new theory and knowledge, and therefore appreciated 
despite the problem of generalization. To broaden our knowledge about the causes behind 
Russia and NATO’s incapability for moving towards a normative partnership is therefore 
interesting and valuable enough in itself. It does not need to be applied to other cases in order 
to have value. In turn, this knowledge may broaden our understanding of what could or 
should be done to increase the possibilities for normative partnership, if that is considered 
desirable. Said differently, finding out why they cannot unite, will help the understanding of 
how to unite them.  
 
Secondly, hence the in-depth knowledge we are able to generalize if not to other cases, so at 
least over time. This can provide us with some assumptions for what the future might hold, as 
I will dedicate a few sentences to in the very end of the thesis. Methodologically, if an 
explanation applied to a certain action or situation fails in order to predict the same action or 
situation on a different time, it is not a good enough explanation Østerud ones said (Østerud, 
2010). As I will demonstrate, historical analysis together with text analysis will offer a 
theoretical approach towards Russia and NATO’s cooperation over the last twenty years, and 
offer a thorough insight to how they may act in similar situations in the near future, hence it is 
possible to generalize over time. This is valuable because if there is an understanding of 
which factors that created cooperation problems in the past or today; it will be easier to 
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understand what could be done internally in Russia and NATO in the near future in order to 
bring the two closer to a normative partnership, if that is what they desire. When it comes to 
the critique against text analysis being too subjective, I will argue that this is possible to avoid 
with a standardized system for how to approach the text, and how to handle the data. When 
analyzing official documents I will use the definitions mentioned in the theoretical framework 
and stick to these definitions in order to categories; as a rational response in order to secure 
national security; or a disagreement based on social, cultural or value differences. This will 
further be structured by the categorization of goals versus means, where goals are what they 
see as most favorable in order to get national security and means are how they act in order to 
get national security, in addition to realism terms versus constructivist terms. The final 
decisions will still be of a subjective character, which is an unavoidable weakness in this kind 
of research.  
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3 NATO-Russia 1991-2010 
 
“Just like a wave on the seashore, sometimes it’s getting better, sometimes it’s getting 
worse”! 
NATO official (Pouliot, 2010, p. 113) 
This sections aims to structure the important historical events that have impacted the 
partnership between Russia and NATO after 1991. As Pouliot acknowledges, peace is more 
than just non-war; it is self-evident diplomacy (2010, p. 42). The number of new channels for 
diplomacy has been an important variable in the post-Cold War peace between Russia and 
NATO. This historical outline will present diplomatic ups and downs. A theoretical 
explanation will be applied to each event in order to see whether a realist or a constructivist 
approach offers the most appropriate explanation as to why Russia and NATO do not manage 
to reach a normative partnership. These conclusions will hence be an integrated part of my 
analysis. In accordance with Thorun (2009) and Smith (2006) I divide the period after 1991 to 
2007 into four phases. I will also include a last time period from 2008 and until 2010. The 
first time phase goes from the time right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, from 1991 
to the turning point in 1993/94. The second time phase is delimited to the somewhat more 
ambiguous phase in Russian politics from 1993/94 and throughout the Yeltsin era until 
Vladimir Putin’s inauguration in 2000. Following this, the third phase will cover the first 
period of Putin’s presidency from 2000 to 2004. The fourth phase will describe the more 
troubled times during Putin’s second term from 2004 to 2007. In addition to this I will add a 
contemporary phase stretching from 2008 when Medvedev was elected president, and until 
NATO laid out their new strategic concept in 2010.   
 
3.1 Identity crisis and honeymoon 1991-1993/94 
 
The first years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia was facing an identity crisis. 
Russia was still a great military power by heart, but it was no longer in position to balance the 
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West. Several Russian characteristics survived this period, and these are seen as essential in 
Russian security thinking (Lo, 2002; Lomagin, 2005), even today. The fear of the alien and 
the threat they may pose is a rational fear taken the Russian history into consideration. The 
insatiable desire for security both against internal threats but more importantly external threats 
have made the Russian state almost paranoid when it comes to security. On the other side 
Russia also inherited the feeling of superiority or the notion of being a great power and a 
regional hegemony. Since 1922, Moscow had been the center of a huge empire, and the 
Soviet Union enjoyed a privileged position on the international stage (Pouliot, 2010, p. 175). 
The nuclear arsenal and the permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council secured 
this position. In addition, the geographical, economical, and political strength over such an 
extensive time period caused the ‘Great Power habitus’ to become one of the most solid parts 
of the Russian identity (Pouliot, 2010, p. 175). Still, despite the Russian elite’s modern-style 
democracy image, Russia did suffer from a lack of a democratic tradition. A rather autocratic 
state orientation where the tradition of servitude to the state (Haas, 2010, p. 3) was seen as 
more valuable than the power of the individual. The mental factor of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union should therefore not be underestimated, as it is the driver for subsequent 
security thinking conducted after 1991 (Haas, 2010, p. 3). And as the majority of the Russian 
military and political elite was educated within the Soviet ideology, and because they 
remained in their positions after the dissolution of the union, this is a reasonable 
understanding of the characteristics of Russia in the 1990s. Firstly, I will list the main aspects 
of Russian foreign policy thinking between 1991 and 1993/94. Secondly, I will list NATO’s 
main priorities during the same period. In the end I will sum up main findings and explain 
how they are to be explained.  
Western orientation  
After the Soviet Union dissolved, Russia experienced a much more Western-oriented period 
under Boris Yeltsin, often referred to as the ‘honeymoon period’ (Smith, 2006, p. 51). Andrey 
Kozyrev, Yeltsin’s foreign minister from November 1990, was an ‘atlanticist’, and in favor of 
making good relations with the West (Sakwa, 2008). During this time, Moscow aligned with 
the West indicating that they were positive to the idea of a future partnership with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (Thorun, 2009). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
Russian leadership, with former president Yeltsin in front, emphasized that Russia now was a 
democratic and anti-communist country sharing many of the Western political ideas and 
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values (Thorun, 2009). This had an important impact on Russia’s international status, since 
Russia was no longer seen as an enemy due to their ideology. However, according to Smith 
(2006) both Russian and Western analysts downplayed the seriousness in Russia actually 
joining the alliance.  
 
What kept Russia from seeking partnership with NATO during this first period was what 
Sakwa has called a ‘domesticated’ period (Sakwa, 2008, p. 365), which means that Moscow 
was prioritizing domestic policy before global ambitions. The Russian economy was crushed, 
and there was no possible way Russia could challenge NATO. Partnership with NATO would 
therefore benefit Russia; in accordance with the well-known phrase ‘if you can’t beat them, 
join them’. This also coincides with de Haas’ arguments. He says that the development of 
Russia’s first national security policy illustrates a realistic perception in considering the non-
military, internal social-economic situation as the biggest threat to the Russian Federation 
during the beginning of the 1990s (Haas, 2010, p. 6). External security threats were therefore 
not seen as immediate as internal security threats. However, external threats may appear when 
you least expect it, and a security alliance with the West was crucial in order to compensate 
for this security-vacuum-situation. Already in December 1991, Boris Yeltsin writes in a letter 
to the Secretary General of NATO that Russia wish to develop a dialogue “both on the 
political and military levels” (Adomeit, 2009, p. 100). The fact that NATO was reorganizing 
their alliance from a defense organization to a security community also made the Russians 
more supportive of the organization (Pouliot, 2010, p. 158). As the threat now was supposed 
to lie outside both the Alliance territory and Russia’s, a common security community would 
therefore benefit both. 
 
The domestic situation in Russia worsened during the first half of the 1990s. Because of the 
enormous spending on military budgets throughout the Cold War, Russia became dependent 
on the Western market to reestablish their economy and make it grow again. This economical 
dependency stimulated Russia’s relations with Western actors. It could therefore be argued 
that the Russian Federations positive attitude towards NATO and the West during this first 
period was caused by political and economical need more than want. In addition to this, 
NATO drastically narrowed the Russian policy-makers political freedom internationally due 
to their strong position after the Cold War (Pouliot, 2010, p. 150). As the only major security 
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actor in Europe, and the world, NATO was given an opportunity to change the rules of 
security on the international arena without any other states being in position to confront it 
(Pouliot, 2010, p. 153). Pouliot therefore refers to NATO at this time as an ‘island of stability’ 
during the structural shifts in Europe (Pouliot, 2010, p. 153). The Russian Federations 
national interest was therefore to improve their relations with NATO, because of the growing 
need for investment, trade, and security.  
Russian national security – picking up the pieces 
The Soviet Union did not let go of its extensive territory without a fight. However, when the 
revolutions broke out during the last months of 1989 (Sakwa, 2008, p. 14) and the communist 
states started to fall like dominos, there was no way back for the Soviet empire. More than 
five million square kilometers of territory was lost, pushing the Russian territory further into 
the east. The combination of the extensive loss of territory and the difficulties they faced 
securing what was left of their territory made border security important. NATO membership 
could help secure Russian territory against external threats, but at the same time it could also 
jeopardize the Russian control of internal affairs within the Russian state. When NATO 
started expanding eastwards, inviting former Warsaw Pact states to join the Alliance, Russia 
reacted very negatively. The fear of having such a strong security alliance increasingly close 
to its borders, in addition to such a strong competition against the ‘Russian way’, intimidated 
Russian political leaders. Would NATO secure Russia or take out Russia? NATO’s concept 
shows that some hostility between Russia and NATO was still apparent. First of all, in the 
Alliance’s concept from 1991 they claim that NATO’s enduring purpose is to “preserve the 
strategic balance within Europe” (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 1991). This 
indicates that NATO still sees it as their job to balance Russia. Despite the Russian military 
and economical defeat, Russia still was in possession of nuclear weapons and posed a 
potential threat to the Alliance. Russia on their side saw a need for balancing back, and an 
enlargement of NATO would make this more difficult. It is also important to note that there 
were almost 25 million ethnic Russians that ended up ‘on the wrong side of the border’ after 
the break-up of the Soviet Union (Adomeit, 2009, p. 47). These Russians have ever since 
been part of Russia’s security strategy, and are several times mentioned in the foreign policy 
concepts in Russia. This also contributes to Russia’s notion of having special interests in the 
Russian near abroad, and, as a consequence, a negative attitude towards NATO enlargement.    
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Normal great power 
What is eminent about this period is the lack of a Russian identity apart from what was 
inherited from the Soviet era. Despite the total economical and military defeat, Russia did not 
reconsider their Soviet image as a regional hegemony and a respected political actor. Russia 
still stressed that they were a great power, only now it was not because of their geopolitical or 
military capacity, but because of their historical, social and cultural position (Thorun, 2009, p. 
33). This has often been referred to as the shift towards a ‘normal great power’. From a 
historical and geopolitical perspective, Russia is and has always been unique. This is what 
constructivists stress when they say that Russia is more than ‘just another state in the near 
abroad’. The relations with the European market were necessary for Russian in order to secure 
the domestic economical growth and in turn their national security. Some have argued (see 
the debate in Thorun, 2009, pp. 2-3) that this period rather should be seen as an idealistic one, 
influenced by Michael Gorbachev’s New Thinking during the last period of the Soviet Union 
existence. However, the apparent lack of options due to economical and military defeat 
questions this argument, as the Russian Federation had few alternatives besides turning to the 
West if they were to rebuild their greatness as a state. This however does not mean that there 
were no idealistic forces towards integrating with NATO and the West. It just does not fit as 
an explanation for the whole period.  
 
In addition to the economical perspective, the military perspective may also be explained 
realistically. The debate on whether or not the international world is anarchic is too broad to 
include here, but officially there is no hierarchy in the world today. Still, there is a dividing 
line between two groups of states; state powers with nuclear weapons, and those without 
nuclear weapons. Even though no state has the right to demand certain actions from another 
state, nuclear weapons have proved to be the ace up the sleeve in international conflicts, and it 
does give a number of benefits. If Russia had not inherited the nuclear arsenal belonging to 
the Soviet Union, their positioning on the world stage and their demands towards NATO 
would probably been severely different. Russia’s position as a nuclear power made it possible 
to continue a bargain with NATO. As a result, the principle of equality, to be seen as an equal 
partner and nothing less, was still a demand in Moscow. This tactical approach towards 
NATO caused by the need for security and economical growth shows how Russia behaved in 
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accordance with realism theory. The power-maximization in terms of engaging with the West 
whenever that could result in more security and power within Russia confirms this.  
NATO – still balancing power 
During the Cold War the allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization never felt the need 
for a visionary grand strategy on paper, since this mission was given in the Western post-
World War II mentality. NATO was mostly driven on a mission-to mission basis (Aybet, 
2010, p. 35), and the focus was on exporting the Western values of democracy, good 
governance, free and open market economies and human rights (Aybet, 2010, p. 37) to 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states. The lack of such a vision made it difficult after 
the end of the Cold War. Without a common enemy, the ties between the member states 
weakened. As a result, NATO was forced to reconsider their strategy, and they did so with the 
release of a strategic concept 1991. This was a rather dull prolongation of the original concept 
from 1949, using the word European Identity as a way of describing the appreciated identity 
of all member states, and the spreading of this as a main goal. This is visible in the 1991 
concept’s first page, where it states that former adversaries of NATO had now “rejected 
hostility to the West”. Russia is not seen as an immediate military threat, but Russia, as the 
Soviet successor, still poses a threat to what NATO call the European identity. Yet, despite 
the fact that the risk of a surprise attacks from the East was seen as substantially reduced, the 
concept still discusses the case of the former Soviet Union as a potential area of instability 
and breeding for failing states. The security concept from 1991 therefore acknowledge that 
“security risks are not likely to come from calculated aggression, but from instability due to 
economical, social, and political difficulties” (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 1991). 
With the severe economical and social problems in Russia, it is safe to say that Russia was 
one of the states NATO had in mind.    
NATO turns towards Russia 
NATO feared that the former Soviet republics would remain failing states, causing instability 
and, potentially, wars within the area. This is from a realist point of view a threat to NATO 
member states national security. Therefore, the idea of stronger cooperation with the Eastern 
European states and Russia was discussed as a way of preventing these states from failing. It 
might therefore be argued that NATO’s engagement in the east at this time was motivated by 
a preventive matter, as they saw the possibility of gaining control and security within the area. 
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This has to be seen in accordance with the structural change that took place in NATO after 
1991. Nevertheless, when NATO started their first diplomatic relations towards Russia, this 
was not in an attempt to integrate Russia in the Alliance. Russia and NATO was still way to 
far apart politically. If Russia had been ready to give in to NATO’s values and norms entirely, 
and settled with the same kind of partnership agreement as the Baltic States later did, the 
partnership process could have started at this point. However, the Russian demand for being 
seen as an equal partner to especially the U.S. made it difficult to agree on the terms. As a 
compromise, formal relations between Russia and NATO were established within the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council. This council was meant as a forum for discussions and 
consultations with the former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe on matters of common 
interest. Nevertheless, when the enlargement issue suddenly broke open during the summer of 
1993, the Russia-NATO relationship was heading for a rough path.  
NATO’s new role in the ‘new Europe’ 
In the Alliance’s security concept from 1991 it is stated that the “Alliance security must also 
take account of the global context”. From being a traditional security organization, NATO 
started on a transformation into a security-oriented community. Still, the concept reveals, 
“none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense”. This must be interpreted as an 
ambivalent attitude towards the global development of the Alliance. At one side, several 
American scholars and politicians agreed that “NATO must either go ‘out of area’ or it will 
go out of business” (Pouliot, 2010, p. 155). Due to the low security threat against the 
Alliance’s territory, NATO now has the capacity to engage outside its own territory in order 
to ensure peace and stability in the near abroad. On the other hand, no aggression were to be 
used unless in self-defense, meaning that NATO would only go out of area in order to defend 
its own territory.  
Discussion 
During the Cold War, Russia and NATO were enemies, and all means used by Russia and 
NATO when dealing with their relations was military. Both Russia’s and NATO’s doctrines 
heavily relied upon this approach (Pouliot, 2010, p. 150). Still, they had some cooperation 
whenever it was a zero-sum game. According to the partnership definitions laid out by Martin 
Smith, this period could be characterized as a pragmatic partnership between Russia and 
NATO. The period is more or less a continuation of the partnership that was already 
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developed during the Cold War. Both parties were willing to engage when it was mutually 
beneficial, and the main concern was the protection of own security interests (Smith, 2006, p. 
112). The Russian interest in diplomatic engagements with NATO was mainly a result of a 
defeated Moscow’s willingness due to the need. It was a result of low military capacity and 
poor security. This indicates an attempt to maximize the Russian benefits. What position 
Russia takes towards NATO may therefore depends on how much power Kremlin is in 
possession of. Realists therefore argue that Russia’s national interest in cooperation with the 
West shaped the first decade after the end of the Cold War (Thorun, 2009, p. 3). The newly 
formed Russian state was dependent on Western investment capital, trade, technology, and 
entrepreneurial expertise from the more modernized and developed western world (Thorun, 
2009, p. 3). In other words, the weak position after years on their knees and the political and 
economical upheavals in the 1990s forced Russia into a more Western oriented position.  
 
Military-wise this is even more so as the Russian Federation had difficulties gathering a 
sufficient military on their own, at least on the level needed to fully secure its interest against 
external threats. It could also be argued that the positive attitude towards NATO was 
motivated by a zeal for being part of the new world community and to play by the new rules 
of this international policy game (Pouliot, 2010). However, as Sakwa (2008) notes, the need 
for political focus on internal affairs made the Russian capability to handle external affairs 
weaker. Russia was therefore not so much engaged in international affairs, but saw the need 
for allies in Europe and the near abroad. Either way, the demand for still being regarded as a 
great power, and therefore be included as an equal and important member state shows how 
Russia wanted this at a minimal costs, i.e. they were not ready to give up any sovereignty or 
control in return for the security and stability NATO could offer. This, I will argue, indicates 
that Russia was a rational actor, concerned about their national interest and power 
maximization, hence a realist explanation.  
 
The only problem with this conclusion is the realist theory quest for a ‘rational actor’. Was 
Moscow a rational actor at this time, or was the Russian state on its knees to the point where it 
was not at all to be considered rational? Realist scholars portray Russia as an essentially 
rational actor that behaves strategically to maximize its relative power position (Thorun, 
2009, p. 4). This again could imply that the political ideology in Russian foreign policy has 
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been constant, while the changes in the ties with the West is due to changes in Russia’s power 
position. At the same time, what is powerful depends on the circumstances (Taylor 1978:135), 
therefore it is difficult to decide if it is the political ideas or beliefs that changes, or their 
political position. Constructivists argue that states are no more rational than the sum of the 
people in the political elite. And the information they have is mostly based on the foreign 
intelligence the states are able to gather. What shaped the Russian view on NATO was based 
on the information Russia had at that particular time on what NATO planned for Europe and 
the post Warsaw Pact states. And like any other state, Russia may not always seem rational in 
their decisions, but this may very well steam from incorrect or uncompleted information about 
their surroundings. However, the decisions made in Russian foreign affairs after 1991 must be 
seen as logical and dispassionate, and last but not least necessary in order to maintain security 
over what was left of the Russian territory. The fact that Russia did not change their Soviet 
heritage, but rather stayed firm on their demands shows that Russia had knowledge about 
their options, and chose what they believed gave more security.  
 
The fact that NATO to some extent was still balancing Russia indicates that there still was a 
lack of trust. Even though NATO no longer considered Russia to be a threat, there was no 
common ‘we-ness’ developed. However, this was not what caused the lack of partnership 
agreement. Still, the growing discontent with NATO’s engagements in Eastern Europe was a 
result of clashing interests. While Russia wanted to maintain their position as a regional 
hegemony and hence be in control of this area, NATO saw Russian interference as a threat to 
peace and stability due to the Russian engagements in the past. Russia was concerned about 
the ethnic Russians living in the area, but this did not have any impact on NATO’s policies 
towards the Baltic. There is a clear difference in political values and a total lack of common 
political goals, but this is not the main reason why the partnership does not develop. The 
partnership is on a standstill because NATO still feels the need to balance Russia due to a fear 
of Russia’s capabilities. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council is however a step towards a 
more integrated relationship.  
 
To sum up this section I will argue that the Russia-NATO relationship during this period, 
stretching from the emergence of Russia and up until 1993/94 did not evolve into a normative 
one because of events explained by realism theory. Russia is a rational actor that first and 
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foremost is concerned about the nation’s security. The western-orientation is motivated by a 
need more than want, and the adoption of Western values is part of this need for entry on the 
European market. As the West now had monopoly in the value debate, Russia could either fit 
in or oppose. Kremlin was not in a position to choose the latter one. Still, Moscow was 
determent not to give up any of the Russian control or sovereignty. Moscow wanted to enter 
Europe with as little loss and as much gain as possible in order to maximize its own strength. 
This is particularly evident in the ‘great power’ tradition and the focus on state border 
security. It might therefore be correct that the Russian Federation had a positive approach to 
NATO during this time because they saw clear benefit to Russia’s national security a peaceful 
relation between the two would give. Also, during this period all cooperation mentioned is 
‘military’, ‘politically’ or ‘economically’. Never is there any talk about cooperation on norms 
for how to conduct policy, or share of values. There differences in culture and norms are 
never questioned. However, the focus is seemingly throughout the period on security balance, 
and whether they could trust each other more now, after the end of the Cold War. And the 
answer to that is that the level of trust is higher, but not high enough. Nevertheless, even at 
the height of the Russian-NATO honeymoon there was an undercurrent of tension that 
remained largely latent (Smith, 2006). The increasingly tense situation in former Yugoslavia 
and the growing debate on enlargement within NATO soon put an end to the growing 
diplomacy between Russia and NATO. Especially the great power habitus in Russia became 
an important obstacle for the NATO-Russia diplomacy, and even more so when dealing with 
the two most important issues during this time period: the Kosovo crisis and the enlargement 
debate.  
 
3.2 Revival and deterioration – 1993/94-2000 
 
According to de Haas (Haas, 2010) the pragmatic school of thought continued to dominate 
within Russia throughout the 1990s (Haas, 2010, p. 7). From the Russian constitution was 
signed in 1993 and throughout Yeltsin’s presidency, Russian foreign policy became a lot 
more confident as it established a more stable and secure economy and domestic policy 
(Sakwa, 2008). Russia was able to balance domestic and foreign policy, and managed to make 
room for more global engagement. One of the major developments during this time period 
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was the establishment of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Then the Kosovo war made 
the newly gained partnership agreement fade, as Russia and NATO barked together in a 
massive interest struggle. This, together with more NATO enlargement debates forced the 
‘honeymoon’ to an end. Each of these occurrences will now be discussed in order to explain 
what impact they had on the partnership development.  
 
“Today the country has no enemies, but neither does it have reliable allies capable of 
and prepared to render support in trying times” 
 (Rogov 1993, in Sakwa, 2008, p. 376).  
Partnership agreement 
The first partnership initiative was taken in 1993, and set the scene for fruitful conversations 
between the Russian government and the NATO member states. The year after, on the 22nd of 
June 1994, Russia signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement under the motto “No 
vetoes, no surprises” (Smith, 2006, p. 62). In this laid an agreement that Russia would receive 
only a limited membership without any right to veto decisions. In return, NATO agreed not to 
take any drastic actions or make major decisions without consulting with the Russian 
government. PfP was an umbrella term that covered military contact and cooperation 
activities between NATO member states and non-member states in Europe (Smith, 2006, p. 
57). Several of the PfP’s objectives were in line with the internal mode of pursuing security, 
transparency, defense planning, and military developments in order to prepare states for a 
closer relationship with the alliance. According to Smith (Smith, 2006) it was a concern 
among NATO member states that Russia would get power to veto major security decisions. 
This was seen as a potential threat to the decision-making processes within the alliance. It has 
also been argued that Russia signed this agreement because they saw this as an alternative to 
NATO enlargement in the east (Smith, 2006), but it was still the first step towards a strategic 
partnership between the former rivals. And at the 1997 NATO summit in Paris, Russia and 
the member states in the Alliance signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual 
relations, Cooperation and Security. This established the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). 
Nevertheless, even though Moscow agreed with and signed the PfP-program and the PJC, 
Yeltsin added to the chorus of Russian officials that claimed “by virtue of its scope and 
substance” Russia deserves a partnership with NATO “different from relationships with other 
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countries” (Yeltsin cited in Pouliot, 2010, p. 183). Despite the Russian notion of being in a 
special position, the final agreement stated that Russia was to play the junior partner as for 
this stage, something that has proven more difficult after the millennium.  
The end of glory – Kosovo  
The year 1994 marks a drastic turning point in the security relations between NATO and 
Russia (Pouliot, 2010, p. 161). At this point, NATO and Russia progressively embarked in 
symbolic power struggles that to some degree still continue today. NATO re-oriented and re-
tooled itself significantly in order to meet the new post-Cold War security challenges (Smith, 
2006, p. 27). Smith (2006, pp. 27-31) divides the main areas of attention into four main 
points. First of all, they discussed the need for a rebalancing of the relations between member 
states as new states from the east was considered to become members. The original members 
feared that it would be impossible to reach consensus-based decisions as new members signed 
up. Second, the Allied discussed the relations between NATO and non-member states as part 
of their external adaption. Here, five out of four elements agreed on was directly relevant to 
the case of Russia. This shows how Russia already in the mid-1990s had enormous attention 
within NATO. The third area of restructuring was peace support, which became increasingly 
important after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the civil war in Bosnia. This was a new 
task for NATO, raising new questions within Russia. In addition came the fourth and last 
point, namely the growing involvement in crisis management and crisis response operations. 
The last one would soon prove to be a difficult area to agree on.  
 
The first major crisis occurred when in March 1999, NATO-members launched Operation 
Allied Force against the Serbs in Kosovo. This created new challenges for the Russia-NATO 
relationship, and proved once again that there is a difference in values and interests separating 
the two. NATO decided to put an end to ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, launching 
a 78-days long air campaign in Kosovo in March 1999. The goal was to bring Slobodan 
Milosevic’s crimes towards the people to an end. However, the Russian political and military 
elite interpreted the intervention differently. They saw this as a clear confirmation of the 
Alliance’s aggressive design (Godzimirski, 2005). NATO launched their operation in Kosovo 
without seeking mandate from the UN Security Council. This severely challenged the 
alliance’s relations with Russia. The Russian political elite is a firm believer in the UN as 
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main actor in international affairs. The political elite in Moscow has always strived to 
maintain a good reputation in the United Nations, because this is a forum where Russia does 
enjoy special privileges as permanent member with the right to veto. This, according to 
Smith, confirms to Russia that the alliance stand ready to use military power coercively and in 
peace support purposes when dealing with non-Article Five operations (Smith, 2006, p. 30). 
Disputes over the decision to use military force without specific UN sanction caused the most 
turbulent and controversial period in Russia-NATO relations in the post Cold War period. 
When it became known to Russian politicians that NATO were sending aircrafts to 
Macedonia to conduct a military exercise on the Kosovo border, Russia recalled all their 
representatives in the Alliance (Pouliot, 2010, p. 196). Later that same year, Yeltsin sent a 
personal note to the White House in Washington saying that Russia would “not countenance”, 
something that was argued to go beyond disapproval and “carries with it at least the option of 
reprisal” (Talbot cited in Pouliot, 2010, p. 196). And while Moscow warned that they would 
veto all military actions in Kosovo in the UN Security Council, foreign minister Igor Ivanov 
also announced that “a NATO operation in Kosovo would signal the start of a new cold war” 
(Igor Ivanov situated in Pouliot, 2010, p. 197). The total lack of a like-minded approach to the 
Kosovo conflict resulted in total deterioration in Russia and NATO’s starting partnership.  
 
In NATO it was seen as a necessary, value-driven operation under the parole of responsibility 
to protect (R2P). National and societal security, basic human rights, and democracy was at 
stake, and NATO felt the need to use military means. The political elite in Moscow viewed 
the intervention in Kosovo as a manifestation of an interest-driven policy of the West and a 
clear attempt by the West to encroach on Russia’s regional and global interests (Godzimirski, 
2005, p. 58). Already after the Balkan crisis in 1994, Jim Headley, a senior lecturer at the 
University College in London, put it this way: 
 
“Russia’s shift to a realist great-power policy led to a crisis with the West as Russia 
sought to demonstrate its great power credentials, protect what it saw as specific 
Russian interests in the Balkans, and limit the role of NATO in conflict resolution, 
while Western leaders aimed to demonstrate NATO credibility and its new post-Cold 
War role as peace-keeper/peace-maker. This was the first major East-West crisis since 
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the end of the Cold War, and Russian responses and actions foreshadowed its 
reactions to the Kosovo crisis”. 
(Jim Headley, 2003). 
Russia pleaded for equal rights to those enjoyed by NATO member states, and most of all 
veto right over military operations under the slogan “we’re partners, not lackeys” (Pouliot, 
2010, p. 202). After Kosovo, Kremlin’s level of trust in NATO was at an absolute rock 
bottom. Russia feared for the integrity of the UN Security Council, its own national security 
and the fact that NATO was willing and capable of conducting military interventions without 
any UN mandate. Seen in accordance with the great power notion, this is a rational response 
due to Russia’s principle of “sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference as key 
rules of the international security game” (Pouliot, 2010, p. 207).  
Interests on collision course  
The second occurrence that caused the conflict level to rise was the new direction in NATO 
on the topic of enlargement. The relationship between Russia and NATO was at this point at 
its absolute worst in the post-Soviet era, but it cooled down to freezing point as NATO only a 
few moths later, in March 1999 opened their door to three former Warsaw Pact states; Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary. While this by NATO is referred to as an enlargement of 
their area of cooperation, the Russian Federation officially refers to it as an expansion, which 
adds a much more aggressive understanding of the issue. Not only did the NATO now engage 
in out of area operations without any defined geographical limits to their interference, but 
they also wanted to expand their core area (Pouliot, 2010, p. 208). Supporters of enlargement 
presented this as if it was a matter of survival for NATO (Pouliot, 2010, p. 164). In order to 
survive as a security organization, NATO benefitted from the enlargement because it 
incorporated areas of instability and uncertainty and ‘Europeanized’ the area with the core 
values within NATO. Russia on the other hand did not welcome this at all. Clinton had 
promised Yeltsin that enlargement would be guided by three ‘noes’: no surprises, no rush, and 
no exclusion (Pouliot, 2010, p. 167). From a Russian point of view the enlargement plans 
issued in 1999 was a violation of all the three ‘noes’. First of all, it came as a surprise, since 
Russia believed that the PfP agreement were to function as an alternative to enlargement. 
Secondly, NATO, at least the way Moscow saw it, rushed into it without consulting any of the 
Russian officials, excluded Moscow from the diplomatic discussion on the topic and from the 
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further development of their relationship with the east. Former minister of foreign affairs 
Andrey Kozyrev stated that for Russia the issue of enlargement reflected a NATO pattern of 
offering “Russia a fait accompli, a final position of the ‘take it or leave it’ type” (Kozyrev 
cited in Pouliot, 2010). For the Russians, this meant total exclusion and humiliation (Pouliot, 
2010), and an impossible situation to make coincide with the Russian ‘great power’ notion. 
Third, for Moscow it also meant having a powerful but also foreign security alliance 
increasingly closer to its borders. The Russian reactions reveal this discontent:  
 
“I do not think NATO is expanding to start a war, but it is becoming a military 
alliance whose power cannot be matched by anybody. We fear that as it gains strength 
and moves closer to Russian borders, NATO will try to impose on us its conditions – 
political, economic and others”.  
Defense minister Igor Rodionov  
cited in (Pouliot, 2010, p. 171) 
 
Still, there was never generated any massive attack on NATO in the aftermath of this 
enlargement. Possibly, this had to do with an exhausted Russian federation led by an even 
more exhausted president Boris Yeltsin. He neither had the interest or the capability to use 
force against NATO. However, then president of the United States, Bill Clinton, went out 
warning Central European leaders against pressing for “immediate membership”, risking 
more tension between the new partners of NATO and Russia (Smith, 2006, p. 63). Clinton 
believed that a rapid NATO enlargement in the east would stagnate the increasingly good 
relationship with Russia, and as a result cause less security and stability in the region. 
Moscow agreed to this, claiming that enlargement would create new dividing lines in Europe 
(Pouliot, 2010, p. 171). The enlargement debate was discussed in terms of power, control, 
military threats and instability. Russia did not say that the enlargement was a treat to Russian 
identity or the Russian values for how to interfere in neighboring states. Russia wanted the 
exact same thing as NATO: control and stability in the former Soviet Union federations. 
However, while NATO saw this area as a threat to stability if they were not incorporated into 
the Alliance, Russia considered it a threat that NATO did move into this region. The goal, 
peace, was agreed upon, but they did not agree who was entitled to be in charge. With the 
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self-image of being a regional hegemony, this was from a Russian perspective a threat to 
national security.  
NATO towards a new strategy 
NATO’s concept implemented in 1999 express a different view on the case of Russia than the 
one from 1991. In 1991, NATO acknowledged that the communist era was over, but they 
were still skeptical about the situation in Russia and former Soviet Union federations. The 
concept in 1999, on the other side, is more open to mutual cooperation and also the possibility 
of a future partnership. The East-West division is no longer so apparent, and NATO decides 
to increase “political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, 
including Russia”. In addition to this, it also says “Russia and NATO have committed 
themselves to develop their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and 
transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area” (The 
Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999). This indicates a want for a strategic partnership because 
of the quest for common interest, reciprocity and transparency. However, this did not turn out 
to work as well in practice as it does on paper. Already shortly after this concept was released, 
the situation changed again. This time, the massive terrorist attack in New York on September 
11 outdated the concept even before it has been taken into full consideration. This, I will 
come back to in the next period.  
Discussion 
During the first years of this period, the partnership between Russia and NATO was still 
pragmatic, despite the slow development towards more diplomacy and cooperation. With the 
PfP-agreement in 1994 and the PJC in 1997 the partnership process headed towards a more 
strategic partnership, though only on paper. The real relationship was still far from a strategic 
one. As in the former period, the aspect of military and economical weakness shaped much of 
Russia’s positive attitude towards the Alliance. Still, while the preceding period was 
characterized by a number of military and economical perspectives, this period was 
increasingly about cultural differences, value conflicts and colliding interests. Firstly, we can 
see this in the case of Kosovo. The growing NATO engagement in peace-support and crisis 
management divided Russia and NATO. The disagreement at the time was not over Kosovo 
as such, but rather the way the Kosovo-case as a situation was handled within NATO. Since 
NATO was afraid Russia would veto all resolutions on Kosovo operations in the UN Security 
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Council, the Kosovo crisis was dealt with within NATO instead. This, the Russian authorities 
opposed. The conflict was therefore not concentrated around national interest or power 
maximization, but rather whether NATO had a legal right to interfere. While NATO is 
confident that intervening is the right thing to do, and refers to the importance of humanitarian 
security and responsibility to protect, Russia on their side see this as an act of muscle flexing. 
Russia has strong principles on non-interference, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia 
also disagreed strongly when NATO conducted their air strike without a UN-mandate. NATO 
on the other hand, saw this as a case where a UN-mandate was unnecessary due to the high 
level of violence and human suffering.  It is also important to keep in mind the differences 
between NATO being a liberal democracy and the Russian Federation being an illiberal 
democracy. While NATO was determent to stop any violations towards human security, 
Russia was more concerned about state security issues. Kosovo was a civil war and did not 
pose a risk to state security. 
 
Secondly, we see a clear divide in interest in NATO’s enlargement debate in the former 
Soviet federations. While NATO considered these states as a potential threat to European 
stability if they were not included as partners in NATO and regarded it as a diplomatic gesture 
to the states invited, Russia saw the enlargement as a threat to their own security if NATO 
expanded closer towards the Russian border. Russia also used uses the slightly more 
aggressive word ‘expansion’, emphasizing the negative view towards the whole discussion. 
They did not want to see NATO in possession of political and military dominance in Europe. 
In the case of enlargement, border security, power-maximization, and mutual threats were key 
stands out as motive for the assertive position taken by Russia. This is realism terms. When it 
comes to the Kosovo war however, the debate was over Western versus Russian values. It 
was not a question of state security, but rather the norms for how to act in interaction with 
other states, and who should have the right to intervene in other states and under what 
circumstances. This points to a constructivism approach, as the partnership deteriorates 
because of a total lack of common understanding of the international environment, proper 
political actions, and shared values.   
 
Thirdly, the PfP-agreement signed in 1994 shows a major step towards a closer partnership, as 
it brought the two closer together, and increased the level of diplomacy. This indicates a 
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stronger focus on diplomatic means rather than military means. However, this agreement 
focused on military cooperation, and not on sharing of values and creating a common ‘we-
ness’. The PfP was also an asymmetrical agreement, as Russia was considered junior partner 
without any special rights manifested in the agreement. The PJC was also mainly build on a 
realpolitik as most of the cases that was discussed was military planning, disarmament, 
peacekeeping and defense-related issues (see e.g. NATO handbook, 2002). Still, the signing 
of these agreements showed a growing global engagement within the Russian government. 
The motto ‘no vetoes – no surprises’ also shows how Russia and NATO was able to agree on 
a set of common norms for their future foreign policy, even though it was difficult to live up 
to. The PfP-agreement ensured Russia access to more information, and more mutual exchange 
of each other’s political perspectives within the framework of the Alliance that potentially 
could have a direct impact on the Russian state and its near abroad.  
 
From a realist point of view, the PfP-agreement is in Russia’s best interest because it 
increases Russian control over the situation in the east. Signing the agreement was the first 
step towards a future partnership, and increased Russian cooperation with Europe. The strong 
Russian reaction to NATO enlargement is also possible to explain in terms of realism theory, 
since it from a Russian perspective is a potential threat towards Russia’s national security. 
The enlargement debate will most likely continue, and this is an absolute incompatible 
conflict. The different way of interpreting the situation in Kosovo and the different traditions 
for how to solve such matters in general also turned out to create major difficulties. It could 
therefore be argued that the diplomatic problems when dealing with security issues during this 
period of time are due to differences in democratic values and norms for how to conduct 
security policy. Still, the overall tendency during these years are best described by realpolitik, 
hence a realism explanation.  
 
To sum up, both realism and constructivism offers elements of explanation for why a 
normative partnership was not developed during this period. The total lack of a common ‘we-
ness’ is obvious, and this is an important factor why the relationship deteriorates. The case of 
Kosovo was a problem due to different moral and ideological approaches to the internal 
affairs, and calls for a constructivism explanation. However the partnership does also suffer 
due to realpolitik. The enlargement debate is an example of this. While the internal political 
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conflicts between NATO and Russia were dominated by questions about national security, 
e.g. border security; most external crisis outside the NATO-Russia territory caused problems 
because of scattered political interests and understandings of the world community and how 
to respond to certain international situations. The great power notion within NATO also 
demanded more legal rights within NATO than the Alliance’s member states were willing to 
accept. This was due to the member state’s fear of not letting Russia get a to strong grip 
around the alliance. This is best explained with realism theory, which claims that states 
always put their own national interest first, and see collaboration as a zero-sum game. Still, 
Kosovo stands out as the most important factor why Russia and NATO do not develop their 
partnership; hence a constructivism approach offers the best explanation why Russia and 
NATO do not move forward.  
 
3.3 Hard Security and Soft Cooperation – 2000-2004 
 
After Kosovo, the great power disposition grew even stronger in Russia, despite the moderate 
military and economical strength they possessed compared to NATO (Pouliot, 2010, p. 194). 
Another factor that shaped this period was the presidential inauguration of Vladimir Putin. On 
the 31 of December, during the millennium celebration, president Boris Yeltsin announced 
that he resigned with immediate effect. He appointed the Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, as 
president, and thus gave Putin a head start before the presidential election later that same year. 
Two events in particular would soon become the most memorable occurrences during Putin’s 
first presidential period. These were the terrorist attacks against New York on 11 September 
2001 and the Iraqi crisis in 2002-2003 (Smith, 2006, p. 89) which shifted the foreign security 
policy back to ‘hard security’. In the period between the presidential nomination in December 
1999 and the New York terrorist attacks, president Putin was sending rather confusing signals 
on his intentions towards cooperation with NATO (Godzimirski, 2005, p. 67). The revised 
Military Doctrine signed by president Putin in 2000 held an assertive attitude towards the 
West in general, as well as an emphasis on military means as an instrument of security policy. 
NATO’s wish for further enlargement in the East in addition to NATO’s use of force in 
former Yugoslavia was from a Russian perspective seen as a clear example of NATO’s policy 
of ignoring Russia as a great power (Haas, 2010, p. 17). With the new president and a boosted 
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economy, Russia was now determined to make a comeback as a great power, and established 
a far greater foreign policy engagement.  
Return to real-politics 
Ten years into the post-Cold War world or international relations, yet another important shift 
in the security environment occurs. With the terrorist attacks in New York 11 September 
2001, global terrorism becomes main priority on the security agenda. According to the story 
told, Vladimir Putin was the first state leader to call in his condolences to George W. Bush 
after the terrorist attack became known over the world. This opened up for further 
conversations between the two. According to Pouliot (2010, p. 211) three main Russian 
dispositions became better attuned after the 11 September terrorist attacks. First, the West, 
and the United States in particular, went back to a rather conservative understanding of 
national security. This brought Russia and NATO closer together. Second, NATO, and in 
particular the United States, revalued material-institutional capital like military force and 
institutional ties. Or, said differently, the West returned to realpolitik and hard security. This 
was a language that Moscow could understand. Third, the aspect of national security and 
border security reemerged as upper most priority as a result of the attack. This is in 
accordance with the Russian foreign policy concept and the ‘state of being’ in Russian 
security policy. Still, this was not a quick fix to the relationship with NATO. It only 
contributed to a temporary ‘meeting on the halfway’, since Russia’s dominant habitus was 
better adapted to a post-September 11 rules of the international game than a pre-September 11 
one.  
9/11 – Terrorism returns the agenda 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks initiated the first military cooperation between NATO and Russia. 
However, the actual practical military cooperation was considered too politically sensitive 
(Haas, 2010, p. 162). Still, it is fair to say that Russia and NATO at lest operated as allies. 
Islamic fundamentalism under the organization of al-Qaeda was a threat to both. Russia had 
already prior to 9/11 stated that they would prioritize the fight against Islamic fundamentalism 
from Chechnya and Dagestan. In addition to the fear of new terrorist attacks, Russia also 
struggled with the drug-flow coming from Afghanistan, which is believed to be funding 
terrorist activity (Haas, 2010, p. 162). At this point, NATO had no norms for cooperation with 
Russia in international operations, but they managed to put in place an agreement that granted 
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NATO the right to transport goods for the ISAF operation in Afghanistan through Russian 
territory (Haas, 2010, p. 162). The Operation Active Endeavour was the first military-to-
military-cooperation between Russia and NATO, where intelligence sharing was one of the 
examples of success. This was a huge step for Russia-NATO cooperation, and they managed 
to keep the agreement in place despite other political disagreements that occurred during this 
time.  
 
In 2002 and 2004, Russia experienced two major terrorist attacks carried out on their own soil 
by Chechen extremists. The first one, known as the Nord-Ost Siege took place between the 23 
and 26 October 2002 as Chechen extremists took hostages in one of the theatres in Moscow. 
The second attack took place between 1 and 3 September, at a school in Beslan, North 
Ossetia. Kremlin was not in possession of a sufficient legal system that could live up to the 
demands of a necessary anti-terrorist operation. In the aftermath of Beslan, changes to the 
security policy documents were announced (Haas, 2010, pp. 18-19). After both of these 
attacks the official Russian response was that war had been declared against Russia, and that 
“if necessary, (preventive) attacks by Russian forces against terrorists abroad would be 
carried out” (Haas, 2010, p. 20). This was pretty much the same response as the American 
president gave to the 9/11 attacks. And even thought the United Nations Security Council 
acknowledged the Chechen conflict as part of international terrorism, states within the 
Alliance disagreed (Haas, 2010). International terror is something the United States of 
America and the Russian Federation is able to agree on as global problem. Still, Russia and 
NATO do not share the same definition of ‘terror’. NATO uses the American definition, 
which does not include most of the terror attacks on Russian soil. Russia’s war on terror 
started during the fall of 1999, with the military operations in Chechnya (Beene, Jeffrey J. 
Kubiak, & Kyle J. Colton, 2005, p. 168), and Russian forces have taken a central role in 
battling international terrorism ever since. The Russian government soon made connections 
between violent terrorist attacks on Russian soil, mainly in the Caucasus area, and the so-
called ‘international terrorism’, which is usually terrorist attacks defined by the United States’ 
government (Beene et al., 2005, p. 168).  
 
Russia is in favor of cooperating with NATO on the issue of terrorism, but the different 
definition of terrorism creates problems. Russia wants the West to acknowledge that the 
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conflict in Chechnya is a war against international terrorism (Beene et al., 2005, p. 172). This 
has only been partially successful. The international community believes that Russia to some 
extent has to blame itself, and the way they have treated the Caucasus region and Chechnya. 
Some of the people that were accused for participating in various terrorist acts in Russia has 
therefore been given asylum in several Western states, including the United States of America 
and the United Kingdom (Beene et al., 2005). The definition of terrorism and further, how to 
categorize the Russian war against terror in Chechnya has become a sore spot in the Russian-
NATO relationship.  
Improved diplomacy 
The global war on terrorism united Russia with the West, and led to improved diplomatic 
relations after 9/11. One clear example of this was the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which 
was established after the summit in Rome in 2002. The NRC, which replaced the Permanent 
Joint Council, provided a framework for consultation on current security issues and practical 
cooperation between Russia and NATO on areas of common interest. The declaration states 
“the NATO-Russia Council will serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the 
relationship between NATO and Russia” (NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, 2002) 
and that all decisions will be based on consensus. The overall goal was therefore to: 
 
“Build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the 
principles of democracy and cooperative security and the principle that the security of 
all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible”. 
NRC declaration (NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, 2002). 
 
An important aspect of the NRC is, as diplomats stressed, the importance of the ‘boring’ and 
‘taken for granted’ aspects, namely the firm timetable and the regular meeting schedule that 
enabled the officials to meet and discuss and communicate political issues on a regular basis, 
forcing them to confront tough issues regularly (Pouliot, 2010, p. 117). Another result was the 
practical cooperation in the American-led military intervention in Afghanistan, which I will 
get back to.  
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Nevertheless, the good times later came to an end. In January 2003 the Academy of Military 
Science in Russia held its annual conference (Haas, 2010, p. 79). Speeches held by military 
scientists, Chief of the General Staff, and the Minister of Defense all indicated a continuation 
of the old Anti-Western tendencies (Haas, 2010, p. 79). This became even more apparent 
when the United States’ led military invasion of Iraq started on 20 March 2003. The main 
issue with this invasion within the Russian political elite in Moscow, was the fact that they 
persistently claimed that the invasion violated the principle of state sovereignty (Pouliot, 
2010, p. 219). Putin probably also feared that a strong American/NATO tradition or culture 
for interventions at some point could put the Russian Federation under scrutiny as well. Putin 
therefore opposed the use of force in Iraq when it was discussed in the UN Security Council, 
in addition to fronting a diplomatic campaign against the launch of air strikes against the Iraqi 
president Saddam Hussian (Haas, 2010, p. 79; Pouliot, 2010; Zaks, 2003). Putin also feared 
that a US-led invasion of Iraq would threaten to destabilize international relations in the 
Middle Eastern region. And he was not reassured on this matter when in early 2002, the 
American media leaked that Russia was amongst the even states on which nuclear weapons 
could or should be targeted by Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review (Pouliot, 2010, p. 219). 
This was again a humiliation of Russia, and a reminder of who ‘won’ the Cold War. Officials 
in the U.S. and the United Kingdom, which led the invasion, argued that Moscow opposed the 
invasion because of the oil reserves in Iraq, and that the Iraqi conflict could lead to a dramatic 
drop in oil prices (Zaks, 2003). Putin rejected this, and stated that Russia “never based its 
policy towards Iraq solely on economic factors or interests" (Zaks, 2003). The main issue here 
was not the invasion of Iraq per se, but the way NATO played the role of the UN in addition 
to the total lack of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference, values that are an 
important part of Russia’s identity. As a result, the relationship further deteriorated.   
What does Russia’s official concepts tell us? 
A comprehensive Russian security policy was not reached until the very end of the 1990s 
(Haas, 2010, p. 6). In the 1999 draft to the Russian National Security Concept, a rise in 
military threats was displayed clearly illustrating a turning point in the Russian threat 
perception (Haas, 2010, p. 16), and a clear turning point for Russia and NATO. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia remained rather isolated. In the article “Russia and 
NATO: The Taming of the Shrew”, Dmitry Polikanov (2009, p. 83) writes that “Russia has no 
friends”. However, Russia soon realized that they in today’s international system were 
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dependent on both a stable Europe and a stable Asian continent to maintain its position as a 
great power. And the relations to NATO and America were of upper most importance for 
Russian foreign policymakers. Former President Vladimir Putin emphasized this dependency 
in his Foreign Policy Concept of 2000: 
 
“We are present in Europe, in Asia, in the North and the South. Of course we have 
interests there. […] Russia should look for partners and allies everywhere: in Europe, in 
Asia, in Africa and in Latin America. But they should be partners and reckon with and 
recognize our national interest”.  
(The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000) 
The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 
Approved on 28th of June 2000 
 
Putin therefore took a seemingly pro-Western stand during his first years, but not a pro-
NATO one. However, despite the growing global engagement, the important aspect of global 
engagement in the Russian administration was towards the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). During the beginning of the 1990s, the Russian Federation believed that the CIS 
would develop towards an organization similar to the Soviet Union (Haas, 2010, p. 4), 
maintaining some of the Russian strength and control in the region. The CIS states are 
strategically important to Russia, especially in energy policy. NATO had a different view on 
this. In their strategic concept from 1999 the alliance emphasized their wish to enlarge further 
towards the east. This would result in an even closer border with the Russian Federation, and 
more control over Eastern Europe. NATO had early conversations with Armenia, Moldova, 
Ukraine. Russia immediately had to improve their engagement in this region in order to 
balance it. Yet, the enlargement continued despite Russian protests, and between 2002 and 
2006, the Alliance admitted seven new member states (Pouliot, 2010, p. 208)., however not 
states from the CIS. Russia was no longer in charge in Eastern Europe.   
 
According to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by president 
Putin on the 28. June 2000, one of the priorities in Russia is to “preserve and strengthen its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity” (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 
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2000), and “to achieve firm and prestigious position in the world community, most fully 
consistent with the interests of the Russian Federation as a great poser, and as one of the most 
influential centers of the modern world” (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation, 2000). This reveals Russia’s self-claimed return as a great power. After years of 
economical hardships during the Yeltsin era, Russia now experienced an economical growth 
and new prosperity. The result was a more pride Russian political habitus. With increased 
diplomatic dialogue with NATO and more engagement in international affairs, Moscow also 
moved closer to NATO and adopted more liberal values from the West. Still, the partnership 
between Russia and NATO are still not a truly strategic one. While several former Soviet 
Union federations during this period was being integrated as normative partners, Russia was 
not. Why is this so?  
 
A normative partnership with NATO does to a certain degree collide with the Russian 
federations fundamental values and principles like sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
interference. Any violations of these principles are in Moscow often interpreted as a threat to 
the Russian national security. Hence, a normative partnership will, from a Russian point of 
view, to some degree violate Russia’s national security because it demands Russia to give up 
some of its national sovereignty and also cause more NATO interference in internal as well as 
external affairs. More transparency in domestic affairs will unavoidably decrease Russia’s 
ability to act independently and therefore also harms their national integrity. The aspect of 
security is therefore of upper most importance because it is so closely related to both the 
aspect of national interest and the principle of power-maximization. Putin is also worried 
about the trend towards “a unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power 
domination under the United States” (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 
2000). If we look at the U.S.’ role in Iraq, this might just be what Putin is referring to in the 
foreign policy concept. This may again help explain the negative response to the invasion that 
is found among the political elite in Moscow. In a world where Russia no longer managed to 
balance the power of the U.S, multipolarity is considered the only way for Russia to maintain 
its position as a great power. And despite Putin’s growing engagement with the West in 
general, the concept reveals a rather negative attitude towards NATO as security organization. 
Putin puts it this way in his foreign policy concept:  
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“[T]he intensity of cooperation with NATO will depend on its compliance with key 
clauses of this document, primarily those concerning non-use of threat of force, and 
non-deployment of conventional armed forces groupings, nuclear weapons and their 
delivery vehicles in the territories of the new members”  
(The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000).  
 
The Russian plan to preserve and strengthen sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to 
achieve a prestigious position in the world community does not coincide with NATO’s want 
for a common European identity with liberal and democratic values. Hence, it is clear that 
there is a conflict between Russia and NATO due to a difference in interests. The question is 
then, is this a ‘social’ interest or a ‘security’ interest? Putin is open for more cooperation with 
several of the Alliance’s member states, just not within the framework of the Alliance. The 
fact that Russia cooperate better with Western states when it is not within this framework 
indicate that Russia has a security interest in cooperation with the West, but not any ‘social’ 
interest in being partners with NATO. This points towards a constructivism explanation. 
Russia is at this point not forced to cooperate with NATO, and have an increased global 
engagement. However, Russia is not interested in turning this into a closer partnership with 
NATO. This reveals tension between the former adversaries that might add diplomatic 
problems. Moscow is moving towards a more pro-Western stand, but does still cling to an 
anti-NATO one. It might also be that Russia feel the need for balancing the alliance rather 
than to engage with it.  
What does NATO’s official concepts tell us? 
In March 1999, the Alliance adopted a new strategic concept in order to take on the new 
security challenges out of area. The ‘out of area’ debate refers to whether NATO should be a 
security organization on the territory of its member states, or if it should also include territory 
beyond this. The debate soon subsided as it became clear to NATO that the present-day threat 
increasingly came from failed or failing states outside NATO’s territory, posing a threat to the 
values of democracy, liberalism and human rights, e.g. terrorism. This contradicts Russia’s 
strong faith in territorial sovereignty, as mentioned in Russian Foreign Security Concept. 
Yevgeny Primakov, Russian politician and prime minister in Russia between 1996 and 1998, 
stated in a press conference “we must not set a precedent in which NATO acts outside the 
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territory of the NATO countries without a decision by the UN Security Council” (Pouliot, 
2010, p. 196). Nevertheless, after the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, Article 5 was 
interpreted to include a terrorist attack on a member state (Gordon situated in Smith, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the fact that Russia emphasized their disapproval against the violations of the 
U.S.’s national security, and showed their support in the war against terrorism, made it far 
easier for the United States and NATO to engage in the war against terrorism in Central Asia.  
 
NATO’s concept from 1991; which covers the foreign policy strategy for the first two time 
phases, and the concept from 1999; covering the last two phases, are severely different in the 
way they handle the case of Russia. While NATO in 1991 is relieved that the communist era 
is over, though still skeptical about the situation in Russia, the concept in 1999 is more open 
to cooperation and also some kind of partnership agreement. In 1999, the East-West division 
is no longer so apparent. The main issue is no longer the Russian Federation’s overall policy 
and existence, but rather the case of Russia as a ‘normal’ neighboring state on an issue-to-
issue basis. The 1999-concept reveals that NATO want to increase “political and military 
partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including Russia” and that “Russia 
and NATO have committed themselves to develop their relations on the basis of common 
interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-
Atlantic area” (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999).  
 
NATO’s strategy in 1999 reveals a more positive attitude towards partnership with non-
NATO states including Russia. The political and military partnership cooperation and 
dialogue was partly a result of the positive development with e.g. the NRC. The war against 
global terrorism also called for a global response, where Russia was an important resource, 
especially on the soft-security dimension like drug trade. Here, the common basis of interests 
helped the partnership to develop. However, the ‘increased reciprocity and transparency’ was 
not as obvious. Russia did not indicate any strong interest in increasing their transparency in 
foreign affairs, and the war in Iraq had set fire to some of the old anti-NATO tendencies. 
NATO’s out-of-area debate did not coincide with Russia’s political values, and apart from all 
practical cooperation in areas of common interest, there were few signs of a developing ‘we-
ness’. The only sign of this was in the war against terrorism, however here, Russia was 
turning to the United States, and not NATO. This period therefore brought development to the 
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partnership situation between Russia and NATO, but only due to more well-functioning 
realpolitik. –Not due to a more developed ‘we-ness’.  
Discussion 
This period takes Russia increasingly closer to a strategic partnership. This could of course be 
a result of few conflicts or threats directly between Russia and NATO, however there are two 
factors in particular that might be said to cause this to happen. Firstly, it is the emergence of 
large-scale global terrorism as a common external security threat, which unites the two in a 
common cause of interest. Secondly, it is the general shift in the West towards a more hard 
security military strategy, meaning that the Alliance moved closer towards Russia, and the 
Russian security thinking. I will discuss these two factors in the same order.  
 
After 9/11, most international attention is on global terrorism, and the political disagreements 
and value struggles between Russia and the West are overshadowed. This, however, does not 
necessarily mean that they in general agree more now than they have done before. The reason 
behind the increasingly good relations is rather a result of the changing political environment. 
The terrorist attacks in New York marked an important shift in the Western military strategy. 
Hard security was back on the agenda, with the use of military means to ensure national 
security (Pouliot, 2010). And with this reorientation, Russia and NATO suddenly spoke the 
same language, and was capable of committing to a common cause: to defeat global terrorism. 
According to Godzimirski (2005) the global war on terrorism ascribed two important changes 
to the NATO-Russian relationship. Firstly, the terrorist attack increased the tension between 
the West and much of the Middle East. As an energy supplier, Russia benefitted from this 
economically, and was able to restore their economy due to increased oil prices and an 
energy-hungry West. Secondly, the American president George W. Bush was to a certain 
extent a like-minded counterpart to the Russian president Vladimir Putin. As Putin was 
fighting his own war on terror in Chechnya against Islamic separatists, he benefitted from the 
extensive American vendetta against terrorism, which both took attention away from the 
Russian war against Islamic separatist, as well as providing more support for the Russian 
reactions against terror. This gives evidence of a realism approach, where Russia’s interest in 
a closer cooperation with NATO is motivated by national security and self-gain.  
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Further, the return to hard security and focus on military means made Russia and NATO more 
compatible, as they now could understand each other’s political language. This is eminent in 
the so-called war against terrorism, and especially in the Operation Active Endeavour in 
Afghanistan, where Russia and NATO managed to cooperate on intelligence and military 
activity. Nevertheless, there has been a problem between Russia and the West in order to 
agree on a common definition of what is supposed to be considered global terror. Even when 
the goal, to defeat international terrorism, was agreed upon, they did not manage to agree on 
common norms for how to respond to the problem, and at what cost. Russia and NATO are 
both willing to cooperate against terrorism, but the way they interpret terror and the 
definitions they use to describe it cause problems despite the common goal. Should Chechnya 
also be included under the term ‘global terrorism’? Should the Moscow metro bombings be 
part of the ‘global war on terrorism’? Here, Russia and NATO still reveal major 
disagreements. This makes it difficult to agree on a common norm for similar cooperation in 
the future.  
 
In the case of the invasion of Iraq, the difference in values and norms between Russia and the 
West becomes even more eminent. Still, I believe that the best explanation for this particular 
disagreement is realpolitik, because of the fact that Moscow fear that NATO is building up a 
too strong global engagement parallel to the United Nations. The military intervention 
violated the Russian political norm and values of non-interference and respect for the 
principle of state sovereignty as the most important principle. According to the political elite 
in Russia, the only organization that can legitimate use force is the UN. However, president 
Putin could probably have done the same thing if he were in Bush’s shoes, but as long as 
Russia is outside NATO the violation of this principle is interpreted as a threat to Russia’s 
national security. Two important questions remains to be agreed upon in order to enhance the 
Russia-NATO relationship: In what cases should military power be allowed, and where 
should the line be drawn for where Russia and NATO respectively should be allowed to use 
military force. –And further, where can they agree on a common use of force? Russia has a 
strong non-interference policy due to their own fear of having other states intervene in 
Russian political affairs. Russia is also a firm believer in every states inviolable sovereignty 
and right to decide within one’s own borders. The fact that Russia and NATO did have a 
military cooperation in Afghanistan, but faced severe problems in Iraq shows how their 
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partnership is restricted to a practical ad hoc manner, and not a general agreement on 
supporting each other on a broader basis.  
 
One area where the discussion is not mainly in military terms is within the NATO-Russia 
Council. The NRC had an important effect on bringing Russia and NATO from a pragmatic 
partnership towards a more strategic one. The NRC increased the element of consensus-based 
decision-making, which pleased some of Moscow’s demand for political equality. Here, 
Russia and NATO may discuss political problems and find peaceful solutions to problems 
that directly involve both. As constructivists emphasizes, norms and values are adoptable, and 
may be exchanged between states when they interact. The NRC therefore may function as an 
arena for mutual exchange of information, norms, interests, and values, in order to increase 
the peaceful cooperation and the mutual understanding towards a normative partnership.  
 
This period shows how external situations and occurrences seem to be an important variable 
in order to understand the changes in the Russia-NATO relationship than what the internal 
situations are. The war on terror and the Iraqi crisis has had more impact on the Russia-
NATO relationship than what military or diplomatic disturbances directly between Russia and 
NATO had. This period is already characterized as a ‘return to realism’, and the realism 
approach function as an explanation for the relationship between Russia and NATO as well. 
The conflicts during this period of time are increasingly about national interest, and Russia is 
acting in accordance with the principle of power-maximization and national security rather 
than according to their values and normative disagreements. –The case of Iraq is the only 
exception, however, the value of non-interference is very closely linked to the national 
security aspect. As the security agenda shifts to a more pragmatic, realist and hard power 
strategy, Russia collaborates better with NATO because NATO also is moving closer towards 
the Russian way of conducting security policy. However, it is not the mutual trust or the 
common ‘we-ness’ that drives this. It is rather compatible national interests and mutual gain.  
 
In Kosovo, Russia was left out and not taken seriously for their great power notion. This 
generated problems because it made Moscow fear for their own national security within an 
increasingly multipolar world. NATO went against several important Russian principles of 
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non-interference (see e.g. the The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000), 
need for UN mandate, and respect for Russia’s ‘backyard’. This was not the case in the fight 
against terrorism in Afghanistan. However, it is important to note that there is an important 
difference between Moscow’s attitudes towards the West in general versus towards NATO as 
a security alliance. The aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks were handled mainly by the U.S. 
government, and to a lesser extent NATO (Pouliot, 2010, p. 2010). And as we can see in the 
Russian foreign policy concept of 20009, the U.S. is treated with a lot more benevolence than 
NATO is. This confirms the notion of Russia being more positive towards the EU and the 
U.S. than what they are when it comes to the old rival NATO.  
 
If we look at the contents in the Russian foreign security concept from 2000 and NATO’s new 
strategic concept from 1999, this further confirms that this period is best explained by realism 
theory. The NRC has moved Moscow closer towards a strategic partnership with NATO, but 
in the concept, ‘state security’ is emphasized as the primary concern in Russia. The elements 
of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference, all examples of realpolitik-concerns, 
is mentioned as the most important values in Russia, and they are also most important in 
forming Russia’s policies towards NATO. One of the primary concerns within Russia is also 
what they see as NATO’s unlimited interference outside the territory defined by article 6 in 
the Washington Treaty. This is a major concern for Russia, and creates a lot of tension. 
NATO on their side also emphasizes military cooperation as an important area of 
commitment with Russia. This seems more important to NATO than exchanging values and 
mutual transfer of political learning.  
 
As the next period will show, the NRC is far from enough in order to keep diplomatic 
engagements stable between Russia and NATO. The fact that Russia sees the need for 
balancing NATO again, rather than becoming a part of it indicates that Moscow is starting to 
consider itself strong enough to compete with the Alliance. And, as I will argue, the main 
reason for this is Russia’s increasing military and economical capacity more than the culture 
and value differences. 
 
                                                
9 This practice is continued also in the Foreign policy Concept of 2008. 
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3.4 The reemergence of a Superpower – 2004-2007 
 
According to German, the Russian rhetoric during Putin’s second term became increasingly 
Anti-Western (German, 2010). The period from 2004 to 2007 is characterized by a growing 
number of disagreements between the political elite in Moscow and the heads of state in 
NATO (Thorun, 2009, p. 2). Marcel de Haas (2010, p. 21) argue that the 2003 Defense White 
Paper issued by the Russian government shows grate ambivalence when dealing with the 
Alliance. On the one hand, Russia showed concern about the enlargement of the Alliance and 
especially on the issue of possible deployment of NATO forces on the territory of new NATO 
members. On the other hand, in also mention how Russia wants to further deepen their 
relationship with NATO despite whatever differences there may be. Moscow’s critical stand 
on NATO enlargement is still one of the most important reasons why the relationship once 
again became tense during this period, even though it is not until 2008 that the enlargement 
issue reaches its peak. The other main issue between them was the suspension of the Treaty 
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). In addition to this, several smaller 
disputes make the prospects for partnership deteriorate. In the following paragraphs I will 
give further attention to these issues of dispute.  
NATO’s grand enlargement  
Russia had at this point in time announced that a large-scale war or armed conflict against 
NATO no longer was probable, and the Russian government expected all anti-Russian entries 
to be removed from the military planning in NATO (Haas, 2010, p. 22). Still, there was a 
widespread sense in Moscow that NATO was advancing dangerously close to the Russian 
borders (Pallin & Westerlund, 2010, p. 151) without giving Moscow any legal right to oppose 
it within the Alliance’s framework. Nevertheless, in 2004 seven new states enter NATO as 
members: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. –Three of 
them former Warsaw Pact member states, another three former Soviet Union republics. The 
enlargement caused irritation within Moscow. Especially the Baltic States are important to 
Russia due to the high number of ethnic Russian’s living there. In the foreign policy concept 
from 2000 Putin emphasizes the importance of securing the rights of these people, and it is 
stated that the Russian government will take active engagement in securing the rights of these 
people (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000). As these states become 
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part of NATO, Russia looses its political influence over internal affairs as well as the security 
of the Russians living there. Another obvious threat to Russia is that the enlargement makes 
the Alliance even larger and stronger. This means that in the balance of force shift. The old 
CFE Treaty zones are also affected, and this causes even more imbalance.   
The CFE Treaty ‘moratorium’ 
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) dates back to the Soviet 
Union era, and is the most important disarmament agreement between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact member states. Conceived in 1986-87 and negotiated between 1989 and 1990, the initial 
plan was to control the Soviet weaponry arsenal threatening Europe (Falkenrath, 1995, p. 
119). The aim was to stop the military arms race and to reduce the number of conventional 
forces in Europe. The treaty was considered a cornerstone in the post Cold War security 
planning in Europe, and was meant to replace military confrontation first and foremost 
between the traditional East and the West division, but potentially also between states within 
the Alliance (Haas, 2010). It was signed in 1990 and entered into force two years later. Due to 
the major changes in the security reality in Europe after the CFE Treaty was first 
implemented, the CFE parties agreed in 1996 to initiate the process of changing the treaty 
from a bloc-to-bloc Treaty (Warsaw Pact – NATO) to a state-to-state basis instead (Haas, 
2010, p. 64). In 1999, almost ten years after it was negotiated, Russia agrees to withdraw all 
military forces from the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, and to reduce their military in the 
North Caucasus, all in accordance with the CFE Treaty. Until 2004, Russia withdrew a large 
number of military equipment and personnel. However, when Russia in 2004 had still not 
complied with the full withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova, NATO together with other 
CFE member states decided to refrain form signing the Adapted CFE Treaty (Haas, 2010, p. 
64). This started a political dispute, which ended with Russia threats to withdraw from the 
entire Treaty.  
 
Concerning Georgia, which is in a special position due to the ongoing tension with Russia, 
agreement was reached in 2006 on the withdrawal of forces within 2008 (Haas, 2010). This 
late withdrawal from Georgia however did not go unheeded within the Alliance. In 2007, 
Putin walks up to the podium in his address to the houses of parliament and announces what 
he refers to as a Russian “moratorium” on implementing the CFE Treaty, blaming the West 
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for rejecting to ratify it (Haas, 2010, p. 64). He questioned the U.S.’ plan to install a missile 
shield in Eastern Europe, and the planned NATO enlargement in the east. The way he saw it, 
this was not a situation caused by Russia. The fact that Moscow abandoned the CFE Treaty 
meant that NATO lost important insight into the Russian military planning. This was seen as a 
dramatic setback to the planned ‘transparency’, which was an important part of NATO’s 
partnership vision. Further, less transparency to the Russian military planning also posed a 
potential threat to the security in the Alliance. 
Energy security on the agenda 
The first energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine was another distraction to the diplomatic 
relations during this period. There has been a continuing diplomatic conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine since the end of the Cold War, and the relationship shifted a lot (Nygren, 2005, 
p. 149). One of the reasons for this has been Ukraine’s flirtation and active drift towards 
NATO and the West (Nygren, 2005, p. 149). The shutdown of the gas supply came as a result 
of a prizing dispute between Ukraine’s government and the Russian oil and gas company 
Gazprom. 90 per cent of the gas transported from Russia to the European marked goes 
through Ukraine (Sokov, 2006). This makes Ukraine vital for the Russian economy and, 
hence, a very important diplomatic partner. As a result of Ukraine’s special position in 
Russian energy security, Ukraine has been offered special prizing agreements together with 
the rest of the former Soviet Union federations. By late 2005, this price was set out to be $ 50-
80/mcm10, while average market price in Europe was 3-4 times higher (Stern, 2006, p. 6). By 
the beginning of 2006, Gazprom demanded ‘European prices’ unless Ukraine would allow 
Gazprom an equity stake in the transit pipeline network (Stern, 2006). Ukraine was not able to 
adjust to this price level without a proper transitional stage, but was not offered any agreeable 
alternative. Since Ukraine opposed any Russian buy-up of the strategically important gas 
pipelines, Gazprom cut off the gas supplies on January 1, 2006.  
 
What this case shows us is how Russia takes on an increasingly aggressive political line 
towards its own neighbors. The use of coercive diplomacy indicates a much higher self-
esteem in their foreign relations. Energy security is an important part of Russia’s foreign 
security strategy, and it could be argued that it also is one of Russia’s strongest weapons 
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against both its close neighbors and Europe. By taking on this role as a coercive power in 
Europe, Russia also made clear that it had regained a balance of power and competitive 
international position, which to some extent was lost after the Cold War (Haas, 2010). The 
Russian notion of being a great power and an important international actor was no longer just 
a vision, but a fact. In NATO’s concept from 1999, energy security is not mentioned as part of 
NATO’s strategic plan. This does not show up until later on, in 2010. Probably, this is due to 
the fact that energy security is a rather new part of the European security environment. 
Nevertheless, the concept form 1999 does mention that NATO is an essential partner in 
strengthening the evolving context of the Euro-Atlantic security, and that dialogue with other 
states is part of the strategy (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999) in order to secure peace 
and stability in the region. Despite this, the Ukraine energy dispute was not discussed during 
the NRC meeting, but Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer revealed that the Alliance was 
negative to the way Russia had handled the case in Ukraine (de Hoop Scheffer, 2006).  
Diplomatic relations 
Despite the diplomatic challenges Russia and NATO faced over these years, the NATO-
Russia Council functioned as an important arena for discussion. When Lord Robertson, 
former Secretary General of NATO and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, spoke to the 
press on 4 December 2004 after the (NRC) he said:  
 
“Once more the new spirit of NATO-Russia cooperation was crystal clear. This is one 
of the biggest changes NATO has brought about over the past four years of my term. 
As I prepare to step down, it is one of my biggest sources of satisfaction." 
(Lord Robertson, 2003) 
 
Since Russia now increasingly used economical, political and military power, the NRC was 
more important than ever in order to avoid serious confrontations between NATO and Russia. 
The fact that the CFE Treaty also failed, and the general focus on disarmament dropped 
(Haas, 2010) it was crucial to keep the diplomatic activity on a regular schedule. The 
encompassing of Russian values in Kremlin’s foreign policy became raised throughout 
Putin’s presidency. Putin managed to bring back the pride in the Russian state, and recalled 
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the notion of the ‘Russian way’ as a good alternative to the ‘Western way’. Russia no longer 
wanted to adjust to the West and NATO in order to become part of it. Now, Moscow acted in 
their own way and demanded recognition for what they were and their way of conducting 
politics. The member states within the Alliance saw this as a more hostile Russian attitude and 
were less willing to open up for closer partnership with Russia. Globally, the international 
situation at this time is characterized by major uncertainties. The U.S.’ inability to win peace 
in Iraq, the tension in the trans-Atlantic relationship, the increase in economical growth rates 
in China and India and a declining world economy made the international situation unstable 
and forced changes to the old power structure in the international system (Thorun, 2009). 
This, together with a growing Russian economy due to major oil and gas reserves boosted 
Russia’s position towards the West. With a more balanced relationship between Russia and 
NATO in terms of military capacity, diplomacy became crucial in order to avoid a new ‘cold 
war’ of political and military disputes.  
 
So, despite the fact that Russia continued their re-emergence as a great power and that the 
conflict level in general raised, it was never at any time any danger of military conflicts 
between Russia and the NATO. Pouliot (2010, p. 39) mentions that identity constitutes 
interests, which in turns leads to action. However, in order to engage in a military conflict one 
must have both the want and the means. Said differently, one must have both the interest 
strong enough to engage military means while at the same time be in possession of the 
capacity; economically, politically, and militarily. A British military officer said it this way:  
“I think one have to differentiate between what is a threat and what is a risk. If you 
say a threat is more immediate, a threat is a combination of capability and intent. Now 
I would argue that at the moment, Russia still has the capability but not the intent”. 
(Pouliot, 2010, p. 105) 
 
As Russia proved against Ukraine, it is in possession of necessary means in order coerce, but 
it is a lack of intent to do so against NATO. A Russian officials that Pouliot interviewed for 
his book said: “We (Russia and NATO) may disagree. We may get sore, both sides, but we 
are not afraid of war” (Pouliot, 2010, p. 101). The relationship between Russia and NATO 
may be tense, but none of the parties have the interest of going to war, nor the capacity to get 
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involved in such a conflict. However, the level of mistrust, that to some extent have been 
present ever since the Cold War period, seems to worsen during the Putin-presidency, and it 
goes both ways (Pouliot, 2010, p. 98). A Canadian official say this about the time period 
around 2006: “I think you can never dismiss the Russian potential for the use of force, but the 
parameters, the limits of Russian policy options are much narrower than they used to be; 
which is a good thing” (Pouliot, 2010, p. 102). Here, the Canadian official indicates that it is 
the means and not the will Russia is lacking. Realism theory would explain this by saying that 
this indicates that Russia as a rational actor considers force as something that would not 
benefit their state, due to political, economical and military reckoning. Or that Moscow does 
not have the interest in military conflict because they know that there only is a insignificant 
chance of winning. 
Discussion 
At the end of 2007, the partnership between Russia and NATO is still only close to a strategic 
one, despite all the effort to become closer partners. For Moscow, the most important reason 
why they do not involve closer with the Alliance is the lack of acknowledgement for being a 
great power. This is seen in the case of the crumbling CFE Treaty. Russia does not want to 
withdraw their forces in Georgia and Moldova as long as NATO and the U.S. engage in plans 
for a new missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Further, the enlargement issues is still 
provoking Russia. In Trevor Taylor’s article on Power Politics (1978, p. 122) he 
acknowledges, “it is in the nature of the state to acquire as much power as it can, because of 
the dangerous and anarchic world in which it exists”. This aspect of states being rational 
power-maximizing actors is an important aspect when explaining why Russia disagrees with 
both the CFE Treaty and the enlargement. One of the things Russia has to consider is whether 
power somehow is a constant sum, or a zero-sum game, meaning that they by giving NATO 
more power and control, has to give up some of their own power and control. –Or, whether a 
normative partnership may give positive spillover because of the transparency, mutual 
assistance and security cooperation. Neither can have it both ways. Russia has therefore, due 
to the aspect of power maximizing, sovereignty and need for control, naturally been skeptical 
of letting NATO get insight into domestic affairs and military strategy since this would 
empower NATO while weaken Russia. Still, in order to reach a normative partnership, this 
kind of openness and cooperation is necessary.  
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According to Pouliot (2010, p. 221), the NATO-Russia diplomacy continued on very much 
the same path during this period. This I do not believe is the case. The diplomatic relations 
improved, and activity in the NRC must be said to have changed the partnership towards the 
better in this period. What is eminent about this period though, is how realism thinking is 
increasing. Russia is acting more ambitiously, and is using economical, political and military 
means in order to force their policy upon other states. Despite unstable economical times, 
Moscow has managed to maintain Russia’s position as a great power, proving that Russia’s 
identity is unique no matter how the economical situation is. This proves that the Russian 
Federation has the ability, the resources and the history to reemerge as a great power, as they 
have done several times before. Already under Yeltsin, Moscow argued that Russian foreign 
policy should aim to gain international acknowledgement as an equal partner in its relations 
with the West (Thorun, 2009, p. 35). The way Russia handled the case of the CFE Treaty 
proves that Russia now to a greater extent is able to balance NATO.  
 
The symbolic power struggle that can be dated back to the Cold War was still eminent, even 
though the diplomatic channels to handle them were better organized, e.g. through the NRC. 
Thorun (2009, pp. 10-11) argue that the political elite in Moscow suddenly became a lot more 
optimistic under Putin’s presidency, with a stronger belief in Russia’s ability to develop itself, 
and the strong faith in the Russian identity as something unique and important, and that these 
collective ideas rise throughout this period. Social constructivists argue that the collective 
ideas affect important variables like state interest and the strategy used to achieve these 
interests (Fierke, 2007). The social dimension captures the importance of norms, values and 
language (Fierke, 2007, p. 168). Russia has developed a different set of norms and values 
throughout their history. The illiberal, autocratic tradition has made state security and national 
interest more emphasized than human rights and societal security. Also, Russia has a history 
where NATO was seen as the enemy. This may help explain why some states are more easily 
integrated into the Alliance while others struggles to both accept and be accepted into a 
normative partnership. When the Baltic States were integrated in NATO this was a result of a 
common understanding of international relations and the security strategy. They apparently 
have more in common with NATO’s member states in terms of values and interests. The 
Baltic States are closer to the West as a result of them turning away from Russia after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States 
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looked to NATO for security and defense against the Russian Federation. The Baltic States 
applied for membership in the EU in 2002, and when they became accepted in both NATO 
and the EU in 2004, it was a result of a long process of integration, including a 
‘westernization’ of their political culture. Even though they were former Warsaw Pact 
members, their political orientation was towards the West. They viewed Russia as a potential 
enemy, and therefore had more in common with the Alliance than with their former allied in 
the east. Russia does not fit into the same category as these states, and are due to historical 
and cultural reasons harder to integrate in NATO.  
 
However, the NRC is speeding up the process of political socialization between Russia and 
NATO, and makes possible an exchange of values and norms in order to educate each other. 
It could therefore be argued that the NRC represents the most important step towards 
normative partnership. Most other states that already have been integrated in NATO have 
started with a cooperation council in order to develop democratic values and increase the 
European identity. Today, Russia and NATO do to some extent share the value of 
communication, peace and mutual cooperation rather than the use of force. Russia therefore 
seems to have adopted the belief that peace and cooperation give a positive spillover effect. 
Realists only see a limited role for ‘reason’, morality, and institutions in world politics (Baylis 
& Wirtz, 2010, p. 8), and believe that states only act within morally when or if it benefits their 
own national interests. Constructivists on the other hand, believe that states take all these 
three into account when conducting their policy in order to build good relations with other 
states for future cooperation and peace. From a constructivist point of view, Russia would 
benefit from a partnership with NATO because it turns the zero-sum game into a spillover 
effect. If the two could find a way to agree on the symbolic power of partnership, and the 
imposition of meanings and legitimacy through social relations, the zero-sum game of 
security strategy would end and there would be a mutual gain in the peace that follows 
(Pouliot, 2010, p. 45). However, Russia will either have to adopt and adapt to NATO’s 
political norms. This would end the Russian habitus of great power notion and strengths, as it 
would become ‘one of many’ in the Alliance, rather than an independent great power.   
 
From this, realism theory emerges as the best explanation as to why Russia and NATO do not 
agree to a normative partnership during this period. As Putin’s first presidential term was 
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coming to an end, Russia and NATO were back to discussing border security issues and 
revealed that there still was an element of hostility due to a lack of trust in each other’s 
intentions. It seems that the overall situation between Russia and the West during this time 
almost took a step backwards and became slightly worse than the prospect was only a few 
years before. So, there are still major differences in the political culture and norms, which 
unable Russia and NATO to move forward. Nevertheless, the state security dimension 
explains the Russian habitus during the whole period better, as the element of old hostility due 
to the lack of trust is still there, as both see the other as a potential threat that needs to be 
balanced.   
 
3.5 Diplomatic pressure test – 2008-2010 
 
On the 7 May 2008, Dimitry Medvedev took his presidential oath. Then, only a few days 
later, on the 9 May, Russia showed to the world how they had finally recovered militarily. 
The traditional military parade, which takes place every year to commemorate the 1945 
victory over Nazi Germany, was for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
celebrated with heavy armor and missiles rolling down the Red Square in Moscow. In his 
Victory Day address to the people, Medvedev stated that “the victors gave us great reason to 
believe in our national strength, self-reliance and freedom” (Medvedev cited in Yuri 
Zarakhovich, 2008). When looking back, the first year of Medvedev’s presidency appear like 
a chain of political problems. NATO was ones again talking about expanding geographically, 
this time into the Russian backyard, the Georgian conflict flared up again resulting in Russian 
military action, the global financial system collapses causing impact both within NATO and 
in Russia, and, partly as a result of this, Russia and Ukraine found themselves in another 
energy dispute. Each of these cases will now be presented chronologically in order to explain 
how they affected the partnership between Russia and the Alliance.  
NATO overeating? 
During the Bucharest summit in April 2008, Albania and Croatia were invited to begin 
accession talks in order to become normative partners and full members of NATO (Bucharest 
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Summit Decleration, 2008). In the declaration it is emphasized that this is a result of hard 
work, and that it demonstrates that Albania and Croatia have committed themselves to the 
common security in Europe and NATO’s shared values (Bucharest Summit Decleration, 
2008). NATO further claimed that the accession of these states would strengthen the security 
for all of the Euro-Atlantic area, as it would bring the Alliance closer to the goal of a whole, 
free and peaceful Europe (Bucharest Summit Decleration, 2008). Albania agreed to the 
Warsaw pact, and was up until 1968 part of the Warsaw Pact area; and both states are former 
communist states under the influence of the Soviet Union. This enlargement therefore led to a 
debate within the Alliance on how far it was wise to go in terms of integrating former Soviet 
Union allies. Several NATO member states drew the line at Ukraine and Georgia, in 
accordance with former president Bill Clinton’s advise (see debate in Pouliot, 2010) on not to 
provoke Russia to the breaking point. Nevertheless, the Alliance agreed during the Bucharest 
Summit that Georgia would become a member in the near future. In Moscow this is viewed as 
a major disruption to their political bonds to this state, and due to Russia’s increased focus on 
energy politics and energy security, seeing Ukraine move towards NATO membership caused 
political headaches. This is seen in the Russian ambassador in NATO, Dimity Rogozin’s 
remark when Russia Today interviewed him in July 2008: 
 
“NATO expansion reminds me of overeating in American fast food joints. Because 
there comes a point when you get so big that you might not get out of your chair. It is 
time for NATO to go on a diet!” 
(NATO envoy Dimitry Rogozin on Russia Today, 2008) 
 
In Moscow it was a common agreement that NATO by ‘expanding’ further into the East, 
violated the strategic balance in Europe, causing more instability in addition to threatening 
Russian territory (see e.g. Pouliot, 2010; Sergunin, 2004). This is confirmed in the Foreign 
Policy Concept of 2008, where Medvedev states “Russia retains its negative attitude towards 
the expansion of NATO (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008). 
Russian officials also believe that Georgia and Ukraine have a long way to go before they are 
ready for NATO membership, both democratically but also military. Georgia is a conflicted 
region. It is divided by a series of unresolved conflicts, especially with the Russians (Pallin & 
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Westerlund, 2010). It is also an arena of geopolitical confrontation because of the gas 
pipelines that are transiting Georgian territory. However, the Georgian membership was 
reconfirmed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, where it was stated “[NATO] reaffirm all element 
of that decision” and “we will foster political dialogue and practical cooperation with 
Georgia” (Lisbon Summit Declaration, 2010). And in 2010, the NATO Liaison Office in 
Georgia was officially opened, and the practical assistance and support in order to establish 
and guide the future reforms towards normative partnership started.  
 
Ukraine does not have the same progress towards NATO membership. The formal basis for 
Ukraine’s relations with the Alliance dates back to 1997, when the Charter on a Distinct 
Partnership established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC). NATO has an extensive 
cooperation with Ukraine in the area of defense and security, and the NATO-Ukraine Joint 
Working Group of Defense Reforms is the primary focus (NATO). The dialogue was 
intensified in 2005 as part of the ‘open door policy’ however; the present Ukrainian 
government is not seeking membership with the Alliance today, but is rather maintaining their 
practical cooperation with NATO (NATO’s relations with Ukraine, 2009). The practical 
cooperation with the Alliance means that NATO is involved in assisting Ukraine in their 
internal reforms. This means that both Russia and NATO is involved in Ukrainian policy 
making.  
 
The negative Russian reaction to NATO’s enlargement in the east is mostly explained by 
Russia’s fear of putting Russian borders at risk, jeopardizing Russian territorial security. 
NATO officials claim that the major goal is to promote security and stability in the Euro-
Atlantic area as a whole (Polikanov 2001:28), but officials in Kremlin has doubted that this is 
the whole explanation. The question in Moscow therefore remains: Does NATO want Russia 
in the Alliance in order to help secure Russia, or does the Alliance want to secure itself 
against Russia? Ever since the Alliance was founded, it has provided the U.S. with control 
over the European continent. One can therefore not rule out the possibility that the real 
motivation behind the eastern enlargement is U.S’ desire to remain present in Europe 
(Polikanov 2001), and now also in the former Warsaw Pact area. The uncertainty in Moscow 
on what are the main motivations behind NATO’s interest in partnership with Russia may 
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therefore lead to a feeling of being controlled and not trusted. And it remains to be seen 
whether this is something that is possibly to overcome.  
The 2008 Georgian conflict 
The Alliance’s enlargement plans to Georgia must be seen in the connection with the Russia-
Georgia conflict that occurred during the same time. A serious diplomatic conflict erupted 
between Russia and Georgia in 2006, after Tbilisi expelled several Russian officials because 
of spying accusations (Pouliot, 2010, p. 223). This was during the same time as NATO 
offered Georgia intensified dialogue in order to speed up the integration process. Since the 
president in Georgia already had announced that Georgia was ready, and since the U.S and 
Georgia already had signed several declarations, the Georgian membership did seem within 
reach. However, the Russian Federation did not approve. On the 7 August 2008, a skirmish 
between the forces of Georgian and of the Russian ally South Ossetia started a new conflict 
between Russia and Georgia. Russian military forces responded already the next day, as they 
drove their thanks into Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian military intervention in 
Georgia raised several important questions about Moscow’s intentions towards Russia’s ‘near 
abroad’ and the future direction of Russia’s foreign policy (German, 2010, p. 94). During the 
Five Day war in Georgia, Russia proved that they were prepared for and could deploy forces 
relatively quick in spite of the considerable challenges with the Georgian terrain (Pallin & 
Westerlund, 2010). Russia claims that the reason behind the use of military force in Georgia’s 
separatist regions has been the protection of the Russian minority in South Ossetia. This is in 
accordance with the foreign policy concept stating that it is the Russian Federation’s 
uppermost priority to “provide comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of 
Russian citizens and compatriots abroad” (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation, 2008). This has been Moscow’s mission ever since the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and the Russian people.  
 
The swift deployment of almost 20 000 men in only a couple of days showed the impressive 
Russian military improvement that had taken place since the 1990s (Pallin & Westerlund, 
2010). Compared to Russia’s first war in Chechnya, this operation was well planned, well 
organized, and executed according to plan, with the use of new technology like cyber warfare 
and a diplomatic offensive (Pallin & Westerlund, 2010, p. 151). This led to a new debate in 
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NATO, where Russia’s military potential once again had to be reviewed and discussed. After 
it became clear to NATO what Russia had done, they suspended all high-level consultations 
with Russia, leaving the Russian Federation a ‘state non grata’ in the western community. The 
way Russia had handled the conflict with Georgia together with NATO’s disillusion with 
Russia’s political positioning over the recent years, disrupted their relations (Pallin & 
Westerlund, 2010). That Russia was essentially a peacefully oriented state that wanted 
nothing but good relations with its neighbors (Pallin & Westerlund, 2010, p. 175) was one of 
the most important premises for European security strategy in the post-Cold War era. Deputy 
assistant secretary of state, Matthew Bryza further argued that the Georgian conflict marked a 
turning point because it demonstrated that Russia was now capable and willing to be 
belligerent, and use force against smaller neighbor states (Bryza sited in Blank, 2010, p. 175) 
Secondly, it raised the question about Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership. When 
Georgia during the conflict asked NATO for assistance, the tension mounted (Pouliot, 2010, 
p. 224), causing even more stress to the situation. Moscow had proved that they have special 
interests in Georgia because of the Russian population living there, and the strategic location 
of Georgia in terms of geopolitics and energy.  
Missile Defense shield and Political ‘War’ 
In addition to the question on enlargement, Russia also had a critical stand towards the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)11 NATO was planning to install in Poland and the 
Czech Republic. Moscow claimed that the missile defense system potentially could be used 
against Russia in an act of war, and hence posed a serious threat to Russian national security. 
It would therefore, according to Russia, shift the power balance further to NATO’s advantage 
and further impede the CFE Treaty disagreements. It could probably also be argued that part 
of the problem was the emasculation of Russia, since Kremlin did not get any control over the 
systems ‘red button’. Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov said that “We insist on only one 
thing: that we’re equal part of it” (Ivanov interviewed by Baribeau & Henry Meyer, 2011). In 
this lays that Russia wants to join the planned BMDS with a so-called ‘red-button’ right, 
meaning an equal ability to NATO to launch strikes at incoming weapons. Since Russia was 
left out of the ‘red-button circle of trust’, speculations also begun on what the intention with 
the defense shield was. Could it also be a defense against Russia? When Dimitry Rogozin was 
confronted with this question, he made clear what he thought about NATO’s plans:  
                                                
11	  Also referred to as Anti Missile Defense (AMD)	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“What is the purpose? It is supposed to intercept missiles fired at Europe or America. 
–But who is going to do that? Pardon me, but are there any fools in the White House 
who really think that bin Laden is running around in Afghanistan with a missile under 
his arm looking for a plot of drawn to launch it from like a fire cracker? This is crazy! 
It is obvious to everyone that the AMD system is not meant as a protection against 
Iran or bin Laden, it is only a poor attempt to question Russia’s nuclear potential”  
(NATO Envoy Dimitry Rogozin on Russia Today, 2009) 
 
This is why Russian officials later have indicated a new arms race; Russia either wants to get 
involved in the planning and controlling of this system, or they will build their own system at 
the Russian side of the border in order to maintain the power balance. In this case, the 
diplomatic means have not been able to solve the relations between Russia and NATO, and 
Russia is responding by threatening with military technical measures. This response gives a 
strong security policy déjà vu. 
Facing financial crisis 
The very same year, yet another international occurrence put Russia’s strength to the test. 
This time a worldwide financial crisis, starting in the USA before spreading as a wildfire 
across the world, causing the Russian trade market to collapse. The worst effect of this crisis 
for Russia was probably the declining oil prices that came as a result of the financial crisis. 
The oil price dropped more than 60 per cent in less than three months, from an artificially 
high level of $140 a barrel in July, to less than $40 a barrel in December (Frolov, 2008). At 
the same time, the ruble fell 20 to 25 per cent compared to the dollar, and even more to the 
euro, depleting the Russian Central Bank’s reserves (Frolov, 2008). The full-scale 
consequences of the financial crisis was for long underestimated, and as Frolov further claims 
“the government tried to wish away the problem by restricting a public discussion on the 
crisis and emphasizing its ‘American origin’” (Frolov, 2008). Because the crisis started as an 
American phenomenon, it did not take long before the Russian public view on the USA and 
the West once again worsened. People in Russia started holding Americans responsible for 
dragging the whole world’s financial systems down with them. As a result of the tense 
economical situation the Russian Federation had to review their military spending and prepare 
for harder financial times. This affected the foreign policy thinking in the last half of 2008.  
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Concepts and strategy 
In July, only a few months after his inauguration, president Medvedev launched his first 
security document, the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation. The main points in 
this concept is the primacy of international law; that the world should be multipolar; that 
Russia seeks friendly relations with the West; that Russia will continue to protect ethnic 
Russians in their near abroad; and, as a continuation of the previous point, that Russia has 
privileges in certain regions in their near abroad (Haas, 2010, p. 85; The Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008). In the introduction it is stated that it is in Russia’s 
upper most importance to “ensure national security, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity” (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008). 
Russia will develop “international cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual respect for 
interests and mutual benefits” (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008). 
However, when it comes to the Russian Federation’s view on cooperation with NATO, the 
president state that “proceeding form a realistic assessment of the role of NATO, Russia 
deems it important to ensure progressive development of interaction within the format of the 
Russia-NATO Council (…)” and “apolitical dialogue and practical cooperation in resolving 
issues relating to responses to common threats (…)”(The Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation, 2008). This is believed to be the inner core of Russian strategic thinking, 
namely to secure the borders and the nation first as a prerequisite for all other security 
planning, and cooperate with NATO whenever it is benefitting the Russian Federation.  
 
The alarming part for is that Kremlin suggests an alternative solution to ensure European 
security. They want to create “a truly open, democratic system of regional collective security 
and cooperation ensuring the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region, from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok” (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008). This agreement 
shall be based on “the essential principles of interstate relations, the inviolability of borders, 
the indivisibility of security and the illegitimacy of ensuring security at the expense of the 
security of other participants in international relations” (Pouliot, 2010, p. 226). Implicit in this 
lays a notion that reveals that the Russian Federation does not see NATO as a democratic 
security organization that unites Russian and European security thinking. The fact that 
Medvedev is proposing an alternative security community does not seem promising for the 
Russia-NATO relationship. Medvedev claims that “traditional cumbersome military and 
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political alliances can no longer provide for counteracting the whole range of modern 
challenges and threats which are transnational in their nature” (The Foreign Policy Concept of 
the Russian Federation, 2008). Whether it is NATO he has in mind is difficult to confirm, but 
at least he seems positive to take part in network diplomacy, which is based on a flexible form 
of participation. Using Smith’s definitions this would though translate into a pragmatic 
partnership, which is far from having the qualities of a normative one.  
 
Medvedev is more positive to alliance commitments on soft security issues like demographic 
problems, global poverty, energy poverty, illegal immigration etc, and believes that these 
problems need a collective adequate response from the world community. However, he also 
mentions that the international community needs a “common vision” (The Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008) for the political strategy. This, he says, is best 
achieved if everyone has an open, honest, and substantial discussion of the problems 
confronting the mankind. The ideas Medvedev has for political and security cooperation is 
very much the same as what already exists within the framework of the Alliance. This could 
only mean that Medvedev is interested in a closer partnership with the West, however not 
within NATO. This confirms the notion of NATO and Russia having too many Cold War 
ghosts, which unable full integration of Russia. Still, Medvedev’s security community vision 
does not indicate any closer commitments than a pragmatic partnership. This is further 
emphasized in the concept where Medvedev notes, “Russia pursues an open, predictable and 
pragmatic foreign policy determined by its national interests (The Foreign Policy Concept of 
the Russian Federation, 2008). He wants to ensure that all cooperation with other states is in 
accordance with Russian national interests. Further, he wants Russia to develop international 
cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual respect for interests and mutual benefits” (The 
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008). This is all in accordance with the 
pragmatic level of cooperation, and does not indicate any closer partnership with NATO 
during his term.  
 
In “Russia’s national security strategy to 2020”, only one out of a total of 112 points takes 
into consideration the future relationship with NATO. “Russia is prepared to develop relations 
with NATO on the basis of equality” (Russia's National Strategy to 2020, 2009). It does not 
specify what kind of relationship, or to what degree they are willing to get involved. Nor does 
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it say anything about what the Russian Federation mean’s by the term ‘equality’. The fact that 
partnership with the Alliance is left out of their domestic security strategy can be interpreted 
in several ways. Russia seems determined to manage without any NATO involvement- –Or, 
they consider NATO as just a forum for foreign security discussions, and not an organization 
that has anything to do with the Russian national security strategy. Still, the document repeats 
the continuing negative attitude towards NATO enlargement and the Alliance’s plan to extend 
military infrastructure closer to the Russian border which, according to the Russian president 
“attempts to endow NATO with global functions that go counter to norms of international 
law” (Russia's National Strategy to 2020, 2009). This, the document states, is unacceptable to 
Russia.  
Discussion 
Between 2008 and 2010, balance of power has been mentioned several times. Russia claim 
that NATO is violating the balance of power by admitting Eastern European states into the 
Alliance. The same way, Russia is also determined to build its own missile defense shield in 
order to balance the U.S. and NATO’s planned missile shield. The return to the balance of 
power stadium, instead of uniting under the same security strategy is rather disappointing. 
This means that despite the PfP, the JPC and the NRC, Russia and NATO is still not trusting 
each other, and are balancing each other rather than creating a common home. Few serious 
military analysts in Russia today believe that NATO poses an actual threat to Russia or that a 
Russia-NATO military confrontation is imminent (Pallin & Westerlund, 2010). This is further 
acknowledged by president Medvedev who argues, “the threat of a full-scale war, including a 
nuclear one, has been diminished” (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 
2008). However, the need to balance each other is still extremely important. The energy 
dispute was discussed thoroughly within the Alliance, since the gas-pipeline does not only 
supply Ukraine, but also several NATO/EU member states as well. The fact that Russia 
actually stopped the gas flow reminded the West what a powerful actor Russia is in energy 
security. Moscow violated important European norms by not solving this diplomatically, but 
they also showed how they are capable of actually cutting off strategically important energy 
sources by just flipping the lever. Both in the case of Georgia and Ukraine, the most important 
aspect is not the action itself, but the signals Russia is sending. Moscow shows the West that 
they are capable of and willing to use extreme measures in order to force their will upon other 
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states. Moscow does also prove that they do not care about Western norms and values of 
peaceful democracy and diplomacy.  
 
NATO ministers have reiterated their negative assessment towards Russia’s way of handling 
certain situations, like the Georgian crisis and the energy dispute with Ukraine (Allies 
discussion, 2008). The Alliance have called upon Russia to respect the international values 
and principles on which the international security community is based, and to refrain from 
confrontational statements and threats in order to work towards a more peaceful relationship 
with their near abroad (Allies discussion, 2008). How this can be achieved while NATO is 
still involved with Ukraine and Georgia remains to be seen. However, in early 2009, only 
months after the Georgian conflict, NATO and Russia did re-establish their relations even 
thought the illusions and hopes attached to the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 had been 
thoroughly dashed (Pallin & Westerlund, 2010). 
 
The Lisbon Summit Declaration offers a picture of NATO’s present day vision for Europe 
and the Alliance. It states that everyone who shares the same values and interests are welcome 
to apply as a member, commonly known as the ‘open door policy’. This means that Russia is 
unable to bring with it certain Russian values and interests but rather have to adopt NATO’s 
values and interests in order to become member. This is part of the membership bargain. 
NATO emphasizes in the 1999-concept their wish to enlarge further towards the east, 
resulting in a closer border with the Russian Federation. In the Russian foreign policy concept 
of 2008, Dimitry Medvedev states that “Russia retains its negative attitude towards the 
expansion of NATO (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008). It is in 
Russia’s best interest to maintain control in the area of the former Soviet Union, underlining 
that Moscow still feels some ownership to this region, and considered the former Soviet area 
as its sphere of influence from which the West should stay out. Russia and NATO’s interests 
do not appear to be compatible, and one of them therefore has to give in, in order to make a 
normative partnership happen.  
Despite over twenty years of peace between Russia and NATO, with diplomatic discussions 
revealing interests in building a common security strategy; the situation has not changed 
much. So, why is it that NATO and Russia are on a standstill, partnership wise? 
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Representatives from Russia and the member states within the Alliance meet on a more 
regular basis than before, and have a stronger developed diplomacy than ever before, but they 
still disagree on the same matters they have disagreed on since the end of the Cold War. In the 
aftermath of the Georgian conflict, Medvedev proved to be very active in introducing plans 
for military reforms and modernization of the Russian armed forces (Haas, 2010). The 
security documents and military reforms constitute the structure of Medvedev’s foreign 
security policy (Haas, 2010). As to its position in the international arena, the foreign policy 
concept described Russia as possessing a powerful posture with a fully fledge role in global 
affairs and being one of the influential centers in the modern world (Haas, 2010, p. 84). 
Because of Russia’s position as a great power Russia has a substantial influence on 
international developments (Haas, 2010, p. 84). The Russian ‘bear’ seems wide awake again, 
and while the close cooperation between Russia and the Alliance looked promising during the 
Russian hibernation in the 1990s, it once again looks very difficult to politically unite the two 
today. The Russian demand of being acknowledged as a great power and an equal to those in 
the alliance is still an absolute demand from Kremlin. What is important to note is that the 
diplomatic relations that started during the last period of the Cold War at least normalized 
more during the 1990s (Haas, 2010), and they have continued to evolve up to this day. As one 
of the senior policymakers in NATO put it when he was interviewed for Pouliot’s study: “It 
doesn’t always go very well, but at least we talk about it” (anonymous cited in Pouliot, 2010, 
p. 117). The fact that Russia and NATO are able to confront each other in peaceful and 
diplomatic manners is an important safety valve in order to avoid serious confrontations.  
 
Today NATO and Russia have, according to Pouliot's studies (2010, p. 4), 1) established 
several multilateral channels; 2) significantly decreased border on their mutual border; 3) 
partly adapted military planning away from mutual confrontation and over on areas of 
common threats; 4) similarly defined several common security threats; and 5) generally held, 
although with some inconsistencies, a discourse of community with each other. Nevertheless, 
as we have seen in the last time period, from 2008 to 2010, the channels for diplomatic 
discussions have been very vulnerable. When Russia drove their tanks into Georgia, and the 
true need for a well-functioning diplomacy was obvious, the NATO-Russia Council failed to 
maintain any diplomatic relationship at all.  
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Where does this leave Russia and NATO today? And even more importantly, how can we 
explain it? During this last period the most important reason why NATO and Russia did not 
develop their partnership seems to be Russia’s growing hostility towards their near abroad, as 
we saw in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. Instead of using peaceful, diplomatic tools to 
solve their conflicts, Russia acted militarily and used coercive power in order to get their 
political will. Russia did not only act differently than the norm within the Alliance, but also in 
a way threatening to NATO. NATO is still the strongest of the two, and in order for the two to 
unite in a normative partnership today Russia is the one which has to adjust. So why is Russia 
not adjusting? Even though a military conflict between NATO and Russia are unlikely, it is 
important for Russia to have a strategy that takes into account both likely and unlikely threats. 
This is common for all states. Therefore, Russia has reason to feel threatened by NATO’s 
planned missile defense system and the deployment of NATO forces close to the Russian 
border. As long as Russia stands outside the Alliance, and therefore do not have any control 
over these military tools, they will decrease Russian military capacity and be a potential threat 
to the Russian territory. Russia saw the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a 
Soviet-light, or a way of maintaining their influence in this region. With NATO’s ongoing 
enlargement in the east, Russia looses this opportunity to control important resources and it 
also takes away Russia’s buffer between their own territory and the Alliance. Border security 
and the Russian sovereignty are therefore important variables in order to explain the Russian 
attitude towards the Alliance. This indicates that realism theory offers a good explanation 
since it is the classical realist concerns of national security that is still dominant. The NRC has 
proven to be an important arena for diplomacy between Russia and NATO. Unfortunately it 
has also proven to very unstable. The dialogue is only stable as long as Russia and NATO 
discus issues of mutual interests and common goals. However, when there are serious 
disagreements on the agenda, it all tends to fall apart. The only fallacy with a realist 
explanation is that Russia has proven willing to cooperate with several NATO member states, 
including the U.S., which for long was the Russian enemy number one. It is when the 
cooperation is within the framework of the Alliance that Russia no longer wants to commit. 
The U.S. is quite similar to Russia when it comes to how they meet security threats. While 
NATO as an alliance emphasizes dialogue, cooperation, and preventative means in order to 
gain security and ensure stability, Russia and the U.S. tend to see military response as an 
effective and legit way of solving situations that threaten national security. It could therefore 
also be argued that Russia and NATO’s identity is too far apart for any stable cooperation, 
since Russia cooperates well with like-minded states within the Alliance.  
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4 Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the Russia-NATO historical period from 1991 and 2010 has given a valuable 
insight into their partnership development. As mentioned the guiding assumption for this 
thesis was that the stagnated partnership development was due to either a lack of common 
‘we-ness’ and a difference in norms and values for what best serves the states national 
interest, or a mutual lack of trust in each other due to factors like military capacity, threats to 
state security, and a need for balancing power. What is absolutely clear is that the relations 
between Russia and NATO are complex, and that no one answer can explain why they have 
not moved towards a normative partnership. However, the analysis does point towards some 
important factors that do stand out as explanation for why normative partnership is not 
reached. In the upcoming paragraph I will offer a brief summary of the analysis in order to 
bring out the main findings. I will then apply these main findings to the research question in 
order to answer why the Russian Federation and NATO have failed to reach a normative 
partnership. In the next section I will discuss the research question in a broader sense, in order 
to apply different perspectives and contexts. Here, I will also include some thoughts about 
where I believe Russia and NATO is heading in terms of partnership, based on what the 
analysis has told us about the past and present.  
 
4.1 Main findings 
 
From 1991 to 1993/94, Russia and NATO had a pragmatic partnership, which included 
practical cooperation on matters of mutual interest, like military planning, disarmament, 
peacekeeping and defense-related issues. The analysis points out three main factors why 
Russia and NATO did not move closer to a normative partnership during this period. Firstly, 
it was still too early for both Russia and NATO to establish such a partnership. The Russian 
Federation suffered from an identity crisis due to their major internal changes. Russia still had 
some of the old Soviet identity, but had to create their own foreign policy identity based on 
their new political position. NATO had a quest for a ‘European identity’ for all member 
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states, but Russia was not compatible with this demand. It was also a domesticated period in 
Russia, meaning that global engagements were kept on a minimum. A normative partnership 
with NATO was therefore not prioritized. Secondly, there was still an obvious lack of trust 
between the two. NATO was still balancing the potential Russian military capacity, and 
viewed Eastern Europe as a potential area of instability. Russia did not trust NATO’s 
intentions, and saw the planned enlargement as a threat to their national security. As seen in 
the analysis, the Russian need for NATO in order to maximize its security is mutually 
proportional with the willingness to create closer relations. Russia was not genuinely willing 
to become incorporated in a normative partnership, but the lack of options du to their political 
and military strength and capability affected their policy. Thirdly, the increased European 
mentality made it easier for Russia and NATO to cooperate, and we see a strong development 
from the situation during the Cold War. However, several conflicts occurred between Russia 
and NATO during this period due to an obvious lack of ‘we-ness’ in their relations. Russia 
viewed partnership with NATO as a zero-sum game, and did not value the ‘social’ goods that 
the Alliance could offer. The positive attitude towards NATO was therefore a result of 
realpolitik rather than a shared understanding of the value of NATO as a security alliance.   
 
From 1993/94 to 2000 two main occurrences ended the early-1990s ‘honeymoon’. These are 
the Kosovo war and the enlargement. Russia had a strong tradition for non-interference. 
Russia is also an illiberal democracy, putting state security first. The difference in values is 
clear, as the two interpreted the Kosovo conflict differently. The partnership deteriorated due 
to a different set of values and norms for how to interact with each other and how to respond 
to external crisis. In the case of the Kosovo war, it is a total lack of a common ‘we-ness’ 
rather than state security or national interest that is the main reason why Russia and NATO 
does not become closer partners. This points to a constructivist explanation. The enlargement 
debate did also affect Russia and NATO’s partnership. Russia was not pleased with NATO’s 
increased engagements in their near abroad, and saw it as a threat to their national security. 
This is a matter of realpolitik. However, this did not impact their partnership to the same 
extent as the Kosovo war did. The analysis therefore indicates that a constructivist approach 
offers the best explanation for why Russia and NATO did not develop towards a normative 
partnership during this period.  
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Between 2000 and 2004, Russia and NATO’s partnership developed towards the better. After 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, European states returns to a more conservative 
understanding of national security, e.g. with border security. Material-institutional capital like 
cooperation and alliances is focused on as a way of handling a global threat, and hard security 
and military means becomes more legit than during the 1990s. This unites Russia and the 
West to a greater extent. Due to the establishment of the NRC, the partnership was moving 
closer towards a strategic partnership. However, the NRC was at its early stage mainly a real-
political establishment. However, in 2003 Putin took a seemingly anti-NATO stand. Russia 
focused more on military threats, and claimed that NATO was violating the principle of state 
sovereignty. NATO’s ‘out-of-area’ debate together with the enlargement to three Warsaw 
Pact member states was by Russia not seen as an expanded European identity and a positive 
security development, but rather a border security issue. As the analysis shows, all 
cooperation was still on a practical level, and the lack of partnership development is best 
explained by realism theory.  
 
From 2004 until 2007, two important factors had a direct impact on the Russia-NATO 
partnership. The first is NATO’s ‘grand enlargement’ in the east; the second is the 
disintegration of the CFE Treaty. Here, the lack of trust in each other is striking. Despite the 
NRC and several attempts to advance the level of trust, neither Russia nor NATO managed to 
take the guard down. Throughout this period, balance of power is increasingly important. 
Putin claimed that NATO’s enlargement destroyed the power-balance in Europe, while 
NATO did not trust Russia’s intentions in Georgia. The fact that Russia decided to abandon 
the CFE Treaty showed how they no longer took reprimands from NATO, and also how 
Russia was determined to balance NATO’s military capacity. As major energy power and 
regional hegemony, Moscow acted increasingly assertive in their foreign policy. Russia 
showed how military means were still seen as the most important tool in international 
relations. Hence, the analysis again indicates that realpolitik offers the best description of this 
period, and that realism theory thus gives the best explanation why Russia and NATO does 
not manage to move towards a normative partnership within 2007.  
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From 2008 to 2010 the partnership between Russia and NATO further deteriorates. When 
NATO at the Bucharest summit in 2008 invites Albania and Croatia, Dimitry Rogozin 
accused NATO of ‘overeating’. The most important factor why Russia and NATO failed in 
reaching a normative partnership throughout this period was however the lack of mutual trust 
in military affairs. This is best seen in the case of the planned Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS) in Eastern Europe. Officials in Moscow claimed that the BMDS is built partially as 
defense against Russian missiles, and responded by announcing a missile defense shield of 
their own in order to balance NATO’s capacity. The general use of realistic terms and military 
means increased throughout this period. The Georgian war shows how Russia had regained 
their military strength, and was ready to play an active role in their near abroad, in accordance 
with their own national interest. This all points to a real-political rather than a constructivism 
theory explanation.  
Conclusion 
Each period consists of several occurrences, and Russia and NATO are engaged in both hard 
security and soft security issues. Some occurrences are best explained by constructivism 
theory while others are best explained by realpolitik and realism theory. Since the end of the 
Cold War, several scholars of international political theory have questioned whether realism 
theory offers a good explanation for political occurrences in our time. Constructivism theory 
argues that all states and organizations have their own distinct values and norms, and that they 
are affected by their history. Further, they say that these norms and values can be shared and 
learned, and that states thus are in constant change, and that interests and values will differ 
over time. The analysis does however not show signs of any such change. Rather, the analysis 
shows that the dominant reason why the Russian Federation and NATO fail to reach a 
normative partnership still is best explained by realpolitik. According to constructivism 
theory, the relations between Russia and NATO should have change in accordance with the 
shifts in international relations. Agreements like the PfP and the CFE Treaty should according 
to constructivism theory have developed their mutual understanding and to a certain degree 
changed how they view each other and how they view international politics. The analysis 
does not show any convincing proof of this. The current partnership between Russia and 
NATO is founded mainly on the same interests, motives, and means today as it was twenty 
years ago, despite whatever changes that has occurred to the political environment. There is 
still continuing need to balance each other militarily in order to secure their own national 
 
 
83 
security and Russia has never agreed to anything that at the time was not beneficial for 
Russian state security and national interest. This is an interesting discovery because it 
contradicts many of the post-Cold War international relations assumptions of how ‘states are 
people too’.  
Discussion upon the findings  
In 1991 the Russian need for more stable economy, western trade and investments shaped 
their foreign policy more than the want for becoming part of the European identity. This can 
be misinterpreted as a want for partnership with NATO, but there are no clear indications for 
such want. As the Russian economy starts to grow, and the military and political capacity 
stabilizes, we witness an increased assertiveness in Russia, and an increasingly anti-NATO 
tendency. After 2000 Russia is closer to balancing out NATO, and the relations slowly 
deteriorates, despite the diplomatic efforts made in the NATO-Russia Council. There is an 
obvious lack of a common ‘we-ness’, and a difference in political culture, norms, and values, 
however this is not what has caused most of the conflicts between them after the end of the 
Cold War. The enlargement debate has followed Russia and NATO since the early 1990s, and 
stands out as one of the main reasons why Russia and NATO have not agreed on a closer 
partnership. Each enlargement process has added more distress to the Russia-NATO 
partnership development, and Russia on their side have felt the need for balancing back by 
increasing their level of engagement in e.g. the CIS. NATO’s new global dimension, the new 
role in crisis management, peacekeeping, and the increased ‘out-of-area’ missions, have also 
impacted the Russia-NATO relationship. This is a political area where both realpolitik and 
constructivism theory may add valid explanations.   
 
The partnership has developed from a pragmatic relationship towards a strategic partnership. 
This is a positive development. The PFP agreement in 1994, the PJC 1997, and later the NRC 
in 2002 have brought Russia and NATO closer together and increased the security, trust, and 
cooperation between them. However, most of this cooperation is still only on a practical level 
within defense and security policy, and very few developments have been done on the ‘social’ 
level. As the analysis reveals, realism terms like ‘state security’, ‘border security’, ‘energy 
security’, and ‘balance of terror’ are a lot more descriptive on the Russia-NATO struggles 
than ‘Russian values versus NATO values’, ‘lack of common understanding’, ‘different 
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understandings’ etc. When Albania and Croatia became normative partners, this was a result 
of a commitment towards the common security in Europe and NATO’s shared values 
(Bucharest Summit Decleration, 2008). The Russian Federation has not committed to these 
values in the same way. As the analysis shows, this is due to a fear of loosing control over 
their own internal affairs and ‘the Russian way’. Moscow has practical concerns for their 
national interest and state security that seems more important to them than the moral and 
ideological commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  
 
4.2 Further discussion 
 
Alliances are complex matters. It is like love between two people; it either works or it doesn’t. 
To take on the challenge of explaining why is ambiguous, and maybe even reckless. The 
partnership between Russia and NATO is a complex matter. It can sometimes be difficult to 
analyze and understand why it sometimes work and sometimes does not. I believe that the 
historical dimension adds an extremely important supplement to the understanding of why 
Russia and NATO fail to reach a normative partnership. Their mutual mistrust is caused by a 
long history of adversary between the two. It could perhaps be argued that the research 
question could have been turned around, asking which are the dominant reasons why Russia 
and NATO should be able to reach a normative partnership? If we go back to the units of 
analysis, I believe it is important to apply the unique characteristics developed throughout 
their history in order to contextualize the research question, but also the conclusion. First of 
all, size matters. Russia is a huge country, and is not as easily integrated as the Baltic States or 
Albania. The preparations in order to incorporate the Russian territory would take years, and 
it would cost NATO taxpayers a lot of money. Secondly, Russia and NATO are severely 
different historically, politically, and characteristically. In order to become normative 
partners, they must find a way to combine their interests, values, and culture. However, when 
NATO during the Lisbon summit announced that they have an open door policy for everyone 
that ‘share the same values’ in order to create a European identity, this excludes Russia from 
the organization unless they are willing to adapt to the Western values. And the analysis does 
not indicate any Russian will give up their own values in order to engage in NATO.  
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It is however important to acknowledge that even though Russia and NATO have failed to 
reach a normative partnership, the relations today are a lot better than what they used to. As 
mentioned in the analysis, at least the diplomatic relations normalized more during the 1990s 
and onwards. Today NATO and Russia have established multilateral channels, increased 
border security, turned their military planning away from mutual confrontation, and 
established cooperation in areas of common threats (Pouliot, 2010, p. 4). This is more than 
many hoped for during the 1990s. From what the concepts tell us, it should be possible to 
create a European security architecture that involves both NATO and Russia. However, in 
light of the analysis, it does not seem likely that this will happen within the framework of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at least not within the near future. Twenty years of 
attempted unification has left Russia and NATO in pretty much the same place as they were 
after the Cold War. The diplomatic relations have however normalized, as to repeat the 
citation from Pouliot’s studies: “It doesn’t always go very well, but at least we talk about it” 
(anonymous cited in Pouliot, 2010, p. 117).  
Where to now for Russia and NATO? –Thoughts towards 2020 
At the Lisbon Summit in 2010 NATO announced their open door policy, saying that all states 
that shared the European values of freedom, peace, and democracy was invited to apply for 
partnership. This is what takes NATO from just being a security and defense organization, to 
increasingly develop into a value-organization as well. As a result of this, and in light of the 
analysis I see three possible scenarios that might speed up the partnership progress between 
Russia and NATO. The first two are somehow a continuation of the realism approach to it, 
while the third scenario calls for a constructivism understanding.  
 
The first scenario is that the Russian Federation finds itself in a situation where the best way 
to secure their national interests are to engage in a normative partnership with NATO, similar 
to the situation in the early 1990s. As the analysis reveals, the most likely cause would be a 
major shift in the worlds power balance, causing Russia to see normative partnership as the 
best solution in order to secure their state security. Whit Asian states like China, India and 
Japan developing politically and economically, Russia is more vulnerable now than during the 
Cold War. This, however, is not very likely to happen in the near future. The second scenario 
would be if NATO ever finds themselves in a situation where getting Russia to join in a 
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normative partnership is considered highly important or absolutely necessary. In such a 
scenario, NATO would have to rethink their bargain with Russia, and make room for more 
compromises in order to please Russian demands for special rights, like veto-power and so-
called ‘red-button-rights’ to the planned missile defense shield. Energy security is one of the 
strongest cards in Moscow. An energy shortage would press NATO into further discussions 
with Russia; however, the question will then be rather Russia wants a normative partnership 
with NATO under such circumstances. How much power Russia believes to be in possession 
of have proved to affect their policy towards NATO and the possibilities for reaching 
normative partnership, and the stronger Russia is, the less interested in alliance obligations, or 
so it seems. Still, the way it looks today, there are no indications of Russia gaining enough 
power to bargain more special rights within NATO before 2020. 
 
The third scenario is what I mentioned would include more constructivism understanding. 
This scenario demands that Russia gets to the point where they are able to see a want without 
this being linked to a need. The wish for normative partnership with NATO must come with 
an element of ideology. –A want for being part of a European identity, and to create a 
Common European Home as a community of values, and not as military strategists only 
thinking about power-maximization. Russia cannot consider political cooperation with NATO 
a zero-sum game. Rather they have to become part of the alliance-mentality of NATO being 
something more than just the Washington Treaty and the military capacity. In order to get to 
this point, establishments like the NRC may add important value. This is what most of the 
former Eastern European states have done in order to prepare themselves for their transition 
towards normative partnership. And as Pouliot (2010, p. 117) mentioned, one should not 
underestimate the importance of the ‘boring’ and ‘taken for granted’ aspects of a firm 
timetable and regular meeting schedules that enable the officials to meet and discuss, and 
communicate political issues on a regular basis, forcing them to confront tough issues 
regularly. 
 
I believe that the motivation behind NATO membership in most of the Alliance’s member 
states is the belief in NATO being a positive force beyond just the security community. 
NATO as an alliance deters other states from going to war, and it also strengthens the military 
defense within each state. –But it is also a community of values that brings a positive effect to 
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more political areas due to the extensive diplomacy and day-to-day cooperation and contact 
between European countries. They are not members because they fear being outside the 
Alliance. The symbolic value from being part of NATO is an argument in it self. This is what 
Russia must understand in order to begin their preparations for normative partnership with 
NATO. However, as for now, Russia and NATO are planning their own separate missile 
defense system, ‘…for who knows, they might change their minds some day’.  
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